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HASTEN SLOWLY: URGENCY, 
DISCRETION AND REVIEW – A COUNTER-







This article examines the practice by the Howard government from 2003 of 
invoking a paradigm of urgency in the introduction and enactment of 
multiple examples of counter terrorism legislation, with claims that review 
and remediation of that legislation best occur after rapid enactment. Speedy 
legislative passage was frequently accompanied by few amendments, a 
discounting of parliamentary and other review recommendations and a 
contrasting unwillingness or neglect to subsequently review and amend 
enacted legislation to strengthen safeguards and increase accountability. By 
examining selected major examples of counter-terrorism legislation, a 
comprehensive understanding of the applications of urgency as a legislative 
mechanism in counter-terrorism law reform from the Howard years can be 
obtained. These applications range between the obtaining of immediate 
political advantage and an ongoing concentration of executive power. 
Several serious and distinctive features adversely impacting upon 
representative democracy were also generated by this urgency paradigm in 
counter-terrorism legislative enactments. The Rudd government has 
inherited the considerable legacy of this urgency bound legislative agenda. 
Questions now arise as to whether proper review of that legislation will 
occur and whether the culture of urgency will persist in a different 





The process of enactment of Australian counter-terrorism law has produced 
several distinctive legislative characteristics, holding great significance for 
the structures and practices of representative democracy, and in particular the 
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political and governmental institutions being secured and defended against 
terrorism. 
 
An important emergent practice since 2003 was that of legislating in 
terrorism matters in haste, accompanying the legislation with claims that 
adequate review and remediation of the legislation would follow. This 
practice gained prominence with the appointment of Philip Ruddock as 
Attorney-General in 2003 and was accelerated when the Howard government 
obtained control of the Senate in 2005. The claimed need to legislate in haste 
was used as an overt political device to challenge the legitimacy of 
alternative views on counter-terrorism issues, to demonstrably assert 
executive power, and to accumulate that power. 
 
A pattern emerged of rapid legislative passage, relatively few amendments, a 
discounting of many parliamentary and other review committee 
recommendations, and, contrary to earlier ministerial assurances, an 
unwillingness to remedy legislative deficiencies that were identified in 
reviews contemporary with or subsequent to the passage of the legislation. 
This assuaging of contrary opinion through the promise of ex post facto 
review - the recommendations of which are subsequently not acted upon - is 
corrosive of good faith parliamentary practice and the credibility of 
government in its integration of safeguards and review of counter-terrorism 
legislation. These developments have potentially adverse long term 
consequences for the legitimacy and credibility of, and public confidence in, 
the process of enactment and subsequent operation of counter-terrorism 
legislation. They signify a precedence of executive authority over the 
contributions of parliamentary and other review in the area of counter-
terrorism legislation. 
 
That precedence of executive authority may be asserted as legitimate by its 
proponents on two grounds. The first is that it is the prerogative of the 
executive to bring to the Parliament bills in the format that it desires, rather 
than the bills reflecting the preferences of some expert committee. The 
second ground, which such proponents might assert, is that urgency is less 
important when it involves the amendment of existing legislation which is 
claimed to adversely affect civil liberties, but for which no instant example of 
breach of those civil liberties arises. In other words, there is an instinctive 
protective priority in initially enacting counter-terrorism legislation, with a 
far lower priority given to the amendment of that legislation which 
subsequently institutes further checks and balances.  
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Such claims are essentially unconvincing. As will become clear in this article, 
the phenomenon of urgency cultivated by the Howard government in 
enacting counter-terrorism legislation was decidedly political in orientation, 
failed to integrate human rights standards, and, as the wealth of 
recommendations from various review committees demonstrates, produced 
inferior legislation.  
 
The two grounds for the precedence of executive authority mentioned above 
are premised on the assumption of a pure institutional authority of the 
executive derived from a periodically obtained, open ended, electoral 
mandate. The highly attenuated version of representative democracy 
underpinning the two claims fails to address the important symbolic function 
of counter-terrorism legislation in reinforcing democratic institutions and 
practices, rather than providing an instrumental medium to extract political 
advantage.  
 
To perceive ameliorative counter-terrorism law amendment as properly 
falling within a different time frame from the urgency paradigm of original 
legislative enactment is to discount any government assurances about 
subsequent review and amendment made at the time of the original legislative 
enactment. It also dismisses the value of operational experience with novel, 
far reaching counter-terrorism legislation, where such operational experience 
vindicates earlier warnings that strengthened safeguards are particularly 
needed for supervising executive discretion exercised by police and 
intelligence agencies.  
 
The phenomenon of legislating in haste in terrorism matters produced, under 
the Howard government, several distinctive features impacting upon 
representative democracy. In this article, these features are conveniently 
expounded by a brief analysis of several major examples of the enactment of 
counter-terrorism legislation. Also considered is the executive response to 
parliamentary and other reports which reviewed the proposed and enacted 
legislation and recommended a range of amendments. By looking at the 
legislative and review processes and the extent of adoption of the committee 
report in each case, an appraisal can be made not only of the impact of 
recommendations on producing legislative change, but also of broader 
democratic consequences. These consequences are important considerations 
for the Rudd government in shaping its own approach to counter-terrorism 
legislative enactment. 
 
The areas selected for this discussion are the review by the Security 
Legislation Review Committee (Sheller Committee) of the 2002 terrorism 
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legislation;1 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
review of the Security Legislation Review Committee report;2 the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee review of the sedition 
aspects of the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth);3 the Australian Law 
Reform Commission review of the sedition provisions of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth);4 and the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee report on the Telecommunications Interception Amendment Bill 
2006.5  
 
Through examination of these significant areas of counter-terrorism law 
reform a broader understanding can be achieved of the deployment of 
urgency as a legislative mechanism in a counter-terrorism legislative agenda, 
thereby expanding upon existing commentary6 and study.7 Such 
                                                
1 Commonwealth, Security Legislation Review Committee, Report of the Security Legislation 
Review Committee (2006) (hereafter Sheller Committee Report). 
2 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Commonwealth Parliament, 
Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation (2006). 
3 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Commonwealth Parliament, 
Provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (2005). 
4 Australian Law Reform Commission, Fighting Words: A Review of Sedition Laws in 
Australia, Report No 104 (2006). 
5 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Commonwealth Parliament, 
Provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2006 (2006). 
6 For a synopsis of a ‘key feature’ of Howard Government counter-terrorism law across four 
phases, see ‘The rush to legislate’ in Anthony Reilly, ‘The Processes and Consequences of 
Counter-Terrorism Law Reform in Australia: 2001-2005’ (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law 
Reform 81, 91. 
7 For a study of a particular application of Attorney-General Ruddock’s urgency claim to a 
single piece of legislation, namely the Anti-Terrorism Act [No 1] 2005 (Cth), see Andrew 
Lynch, ‘Legislating with Urgency – The Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act [No 1] 2005’ 
(2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 747. Lynch examines in detail the implications 
of the use of urgency in the context of the Anti-Terrorism Act [No 1] 2005 (Cth), which 
involved a change from the use of the definite article ‘the’ to the indefinite article ‘a’ in 
relation to ‘terrorist act’. This change produced a broader application of the legislation to more 
indefinite circumstances, therefore allowing earlier police intervention in the activities of 
suspects. As observed ‘The amendments will clarify that it is not necessary for the prosecution 
to identify a specific terrorist act. It will be sufficient for the prosecution to prove that the 
particular conduct was related to ‘a’ terrorist act’: John Howard, ‘Anti-Terrorism Bill’ (Press 
Release 2 November 2005). In that example, there was pressure on the Government to make 
the described legislative change because of the unidentified nature of the terrorist target(s) 
revealed in November 2005 as part of the joint police and intelligence Operation Pendennis in 
Sydney and Melbourne. Other critical academic commentary on the urgency claim is to be 
found in Martin Krygier, ‘War on Terror’ in Robert Manne (ed), Dear Mr Rudd: Ideas For A 
Better Australia (2008), 137; Greg Carne, ‘Prevent, Detain, Control and Order?: Legislative 
Process and Executive Outcomes in Enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth)’ 
(2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 17, 76; and Greg Carne, ‘Brigitte and the French 
Connection: Security Carte Blanche or A La Carte?’ (2004) 9 Deakin Law Review 573, 599. 
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understanding will confirm the paradigm of urgency as a central operating 
principle in the Howard government’s political methodology in a significant 
and sustained counter-terrorism legislative agenda. The Howard 
government’s operating principle of urgency coincidentally existed alongside 
two other significant operating devices frequently invoked during and after 
enactment of counter-terrorism legislation. These devices, which were used 
to defend counter-terrorism legislation against claims of excessive erosion of 
civil liberties, asserted that Australian legislation, in contrast to the legislation 
of other common law jurisdictions, is very ‘detailed’ and that it is 
‘balanced’.8  
 
Questions of an enduring legacy or a transitional adjustment now face the 
Rudd government from the consequences of that urgency paradigm, in the 
form of counter-terrorism legislative practices and a vast body of legislation. 
Will counter-terrorism legislation produced in that paradigm persist, or 
should it now be systematically amended to implement the recommendations 
of the various reviews? And has the urgency culture in relation to counter-
terrorism legislation become so institutionally entrenched as to persist under 
a new government? 
                                                                                                               
See also Andrew Lynch, ‘Hasty Law-making Diminishes Public Respect for the Law Itself’, 
Canberra Times (Canberra) 3 April 2006; and George Williams, ‘New Law Frees Spy 
Agencies to Snoop on the Innocent’, The Age (Melbourne) 3 April 2006. Further commentary, 
identifying in passing the rushed nature of counter-terrorism law reform, will be mentioned 
later in this article. 
8 These appellations of detail and balance are, of course, entirely subjective and fail to 
withstand rigorous scrutiny. On the claim that Australian counter-terrorism legislation is very 
detailed so as to protect civil rights, see Carne, ‘Prevent, Detain, Control and Order?: 
Legislative Process and Executive Outcomes in Enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
(Cth)’ above n 7, 61-71. On the issue of the government claim of balance in counter-terrorism 
laws, see Simon Bronitt, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty: Critical Perspectives on Terrorism 
Law Reform’ in Miriam Gani and Penelope Matthew, Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War On 
Terror’ (2008), 65; Simon Bronitt, ‘Constitutional Rhetoric v Criminal Justice Realities: 
Unbalanced Responses to Terrorism?’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 76; Simon Bronitt and 
James Stellios, ‘Sedition, Security and Human Rights: “Unbalanced” Law Reform in the “War 
on Terror”’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 923; Simon Bronitt and Bernadette 
McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2005), 875-6; Jenny Hocking, ‘Liberty, 
Security and The State’ in Peter Saunders and James Walter, Ideas and Influence (2005) 184-
7; Jenny Hocking, ‘Protecting Democracy By Preserving Justice: “Even for the Feared and 
The Hated”’(2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 319, 335-6; Christopher 
Michaelsen, ‘Balancing Civil Liberties against National Security? A Critique of 
Counterterrorism Rhetoric’ (2006) 29 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1; Carne, 
‘Brigitte and the French Connection’ above n 7, 613-614; Ben Golder and George Williams, 
‘Balancing National Security and Human Rights: Assessing the Legal Response of Common 
Law Nations to the Threat of Terrorism’ (2006) 8 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 43; 
and Krygier, above n 7, 135-7. Attorney-General Ruddock persisted in using the balancing 
model: Philip Ruddock, ‘Striking a Balance’ (2007) Lawyers Weekly (August) 16. 
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Examples examined in this article demonstrate significant legislative 
deficiencies flowing from the urgency culture within which counter-terrorism 
legislation was enacted in the later years of the Howard government.  
 
 
II THE SECURITY LEGISLATION REVIEW COMMITTEE 
REPORT (SHELLER COMMITTEE REPORT): A REVIEW OF 
SIX 2002 COMMONWEALTH TERRORISM LAW 
 
A Establishment and Background of the Sheller 
Committee 
 
The Security Legislation Review Committee (SLRC) (Sheller Committee) 
was established pursuant to section 4(1) of the Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002.9 Section 4(1) of that Act required the 
Attorney-General to cause a review of the operation, effectiveness and 
implications of amendments made by six Acts to be carried out.10 This review 
was required as soon as practicable after the third anniversary of the 
commencement of the amendments.11 
 
Membership of the Security Legislation Review Committee was established 
by section 4(4) of the Act, comprising two persons appointed by the 
Attorney-General (the appointees being the Hon Simon Sheller, a retired 
NSW Supreme Court judge and Mr John Davies, a former ACT Chief Police 
Officer), the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, the Privacy 
Commissioner, the Human Rights Commissioner, the Commonwealth 
Ombudsman and two persons appointed by the Attorney-General on the 
nomination of the Law Council of Australia.12  
 
                                                
9 As amended by the Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth). 
10 The Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth), the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism Act 2002 (Cth), the Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 (Cth), the Border Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002 
(Cth), the Telecommunications Interception Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth) and the 
Criminal Code Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth). 
11 Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 (Cth) s 4 (2). See also Sheller 
Committee Report, above n 1, 19. The 2002 legislation was subsequently amended: Sheller 
Committee Report, above n 1, Annexure A. 
12 Ibid 20. 
2008                                                                          Counter-Terrorism Legislation 55 
The Security Legislation Review Committee conducted its inquiry over a six 
month period from 21 October 2005. It received written submissions13 and 
background briefings14 and conducted public hearings.15 The Committee 
reported to the Commonwealth Attorney-General on 21 April 2006 and the 
report was tabled in Parliament on 15 June 2006.  
 
The inquiry and subsequent report are interesting in that the establishment of 
the inquiry was ultimately the product of parliamentary negotiations at a time 
when the government did not have control of the Senate.16 This lack of 
Senate control enabled the inclusion of this significant review mechanism as 
a means of ensuring passage of the legislation. The report of the Committee 
is noteworthy for two prominent characteristics.  
 
B The Findings of the Sheller Committee 
 
On the one hand, the report acknowledges the claims of counter-terrorism 
law reform: the need for additional security legislation,17 the 
acknowledgment of its preventative role18 and the fact that, up to the time of 
the report, there had not been excessive or improper use of the Act’s 
provisions that fell within the scope of the review.19 At the same time the 
Committee stated that there had been very limited practical experience of 
how the provisions operated.20  
 
                                                
13 A total of 35 submissions were received from professional, community and special interest 
groups, individuals, state governments, police and security organisations, Directors of Public 
Prosecutions, federal government bodies and independent statutory bodies: ibid 23. 
14 From the Australian Federal Police, Customs, Austrac and the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions: ibid. 
15 Ibid 23-4. The public hearings were conducted over 8 days in Sydney, Canberra, Melbourne 
and Perth. 
16 For a discussion of the change in dynamics of Senate review processes following the 
Howard government obtaining control of the Senate on 1 July 2005, see John Halligan, Robin 
Miller and John Power, Parliament in the Twenty-first Century: Institutional Reform and 
Emerging Roles (2005), 255-9. The Howard government control of the Senate brought to an 
end what Uhr described as ‘The Age of Minority’, whereby ‘rejuvenation of the legislative 
process … has come about at the insistence of the minor parties and with the support, often 
only given grudgingly, by oppositions desperate enough to help unpave the path of 
government convenience’: John Uhr, Deliberative Democracy in Australia: The Changing 
Place of Parliament (1998) 146.  
17 Sheller Committee Report, above n 1, 3. 
18 Ibid 3. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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On the other hand, the report raises several critical issues, such as a 
demonstrated intrusion upon well established human rights,21 the need for 
proportionality in achieving the intended object of security,22 the absence of a 
sunset clause in the Act and of a Charter of Human Rights through which 
review could be mandated,23 and the impact of fear, alienation and distrust of 
authority in Muslim communities.24 These differentiated perspectives reflect 
the larger and commonly stated challenge in this type of legislation: ‘that an 
appropriate balance must be struck between, on the one hand, the need to 
protect the community from terrorist activity and, on the other hand, the 
maintenance of fundamental human rights and freedoms’.25 
 
However, in its assessment of that balance, it is significant that the 
Committee raises four primary areas of concern. These are (1) the executive 
process of proscribing an organisation as a terrorist organisation,26 (2) the 
creation of an offence of associating with terrorist organisations,27 (3) the 
creation of an offence of advocating the doing of a terrorist act,28 and (4) the 
application of strict liability to elements of a criminal offence.29 
 
The Committee made a range of recommendations indicating that there were 
significant concerns about the appropriateness of the balance actually 
achieved under the legislation. Aside from the four most prominent areas 
already mentioned, 16 other recommendations and several key findings were 
made. 
 
These further recommendations were extensive and detailed.30 They included 
recommendations that continuing review of security legislation be made by 
an independent body within the next three years; that greater efforts be made 
by Australian governments to explain the security legislation to, and 
communicate with, the Muslim and Arab communities; that proscription of a 
terrorist organisation be publicised; that the requirement be deleted that 
‘harm’ in the definition of ‘terrorist act’ be physical; that the concept of harm 
in that definition be extended to include serious harm to a person’s mental 
health; that references to ‘threats of action’ be removed from the definition of 




24 Ibid 5. 
25 Ibid 3. 
26 Ibid 4. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 5. 
29 Ibid. 
30 A summary of the Sheller Committee recommendations is to be found at ibid 8-14. 
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‘terrorist act’; that a separate offence of ‘threat of action’ or ‘threat to commit 
a terrorist act’ be included in the legislation; that the section 102.1(1A) 
offence31 be omitted or that the risk referred to be amended to read 
‘substantial risk’; that consideration be given to deleting paragraph (a) of the 
definition of ‘terrorist organisation’32 so that proscription would be the only 
way by which an organisation would become an unlawful terrorist 
organisation; that the defendant’s burden of proving that he or she took all 
reasonable steps to cease to be a member of a terrorist organisation as soon as 
practicable after that person knew that the organisation was a terrorist 
organisation be reduced from a legal burden to an evidential burden; that the 
offence of training a terrorist organisation or receiving training from a 
terrorist organisation be redrafted to make it an element of the offence either 
that the training is connected with a terrorist act or that the training is such as 
could reasonably prepare the organisation, or the person receiving the 
training, to engage in, or assist with, a terrorist act, as well as be extended to 
cover participation in training; that the defendant should bear at most an 
evidentiary burden in relation to the offence of getting funds to, from or for a 
terrorist organisation and that two purposive exemptions from criminal 
liability - for the provision of legal representation in proceedings and 
assistance to enable the organisation to comply with a law - should be 
provided in relation to the receipt by a person of funds from a terrorist 
organisation; that the offence of providing support to a terrorist organisation 
be amended so that ‘support’ cannot be construed to include views that 
appear to be favourable to a proscribed organisation and its stated objective; 
that the section 102.8 offence of associating with terrorist organisations be 
repealed; that the word ‘intentionally’ be inserted in the section 103 offence 
of financing terrorism; that the section 103 offence be re-drafted to make 
clear that the intended recipient of funds is a terrorist; that the section 
80.1(1)(f) offence of conduct assisting another country or an organisation 
engaged in armed hostilities against the Australian Defence Force be 
amended to require, as an element of the offence, that the person knows that 
the other country or the organisation is engaged in armed hostilities against 
the Australian Defence Force; that the government give consideration to 
implementation of the eight recommendations by Customs on border 
security; and that a hoax offence of making a credible and serious threat to 
                                                
31 Where the organisation directly praises the doing of a terrorist act in circumstances ‘where 
there is a risk that such praise might have the effect of leading a person … to engage in a 
terrorist act’. 
32 The definition of ‘terrorist organisation’ in paragraph (a) provides that ‘an organisation that 
is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a 
terrorist act’… is a terrorist organisation. 
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commit a terrorist act be added to the Criminal Code, based on the UN Draft 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.  
 
C Government Submissions to the Sheller Committee 
 
Some important observations can be made about government approaches 
both during the Committee hearings and subsequently, in response to the 
Sheller Committee Report. The Attorney-General’s Department submissions 
to the Sheller Committee placed an emphasis upon enhancing executive 
discretion and the simplification of prosecutorial requirements in terrorism 
offences.  
 
Receiving primary emphasis in the departmental submissions to the 
Committee is the statement that the terrorism legislation is preventative in 
nature, marking out objectives different from those of conventional criminal 
law.33 The submissions strongly advocated a ‘simplifying’ of the definition of 
a ‘terrorist act’ - the definition forming the basis of various terrorism offences 
– by removing the requirement that the action must be done or the threat 
made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause.34 The removal of this requirement is advocated on the basis that 
prosecutions are made more difficult by it35 and that other overseas 
jurisdictions do not require the proof of such an intention.36 Such 
‘simplification’ would both broaden the scope of what constitutes a terrorism 
offence (each offence carrying substantial penalties) and provide greater 
discretion and scope for prosecuting, as terrorism offences, a broader range of 
behaviour. This executive flexibility in discretion and scope relating to 
terrorism offences is confirmed by the claim that ‘the defences in 
                                                
33 See Attorney-General’s Department National Security Laws – Preliminary Submission, 1 
(hereafter A-G Preliminary Submission); Security Legislation Review Attorney-General’s 
Department Submission February 2006, 6 (hereafter A-G February 2006 Submission); and 
Security Legislation Review Attorney-General’s Department Submission No 2 Response to 
Questions Taken on Notice during Hearing on 3 February 2006, March 2006, 8-10 (hereafter 
A-G March 2006 Submission). 
34 Criminal Code (Cth) s 100.1, ‘Terrorist act’ paragraph (b). The removal of the intention of 
advancing a political, religious or ideological cause is advocated in A-G Preliminary 
Submission, 2; A-G February 2006 Submission, 12 and A-G March 2006 Submission, 6: ‘In the 
Department’s view, the requirement of proving an intention of advancing a political, religious 
or ideological cause would add an unwarranted level of complication to terrorism trials’. 
35A-G February 2006 Submission, 12 and A-G March 2006 Submission, 5 ‘Furthermore, the 
requirement that this intention be proved beyond a reasonable doubt places a heavy burden on 
the prosecution and has the potential of diverting attention away from the key issues in a 
terrorism related trial’. 
36 A-G Preliminary Submission, 2; A-G February 2006 submission, 12 and A-G March 2006 
submission, 6. 
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subparagraph 100.1(3) add unnecessary complexity’.37 These claims are 
disarming in the casual manner in which the factors differentiating terrorism 
level offences from other violent offences are discounted, in an apparent 
attempt to arm the executive with greater discretion and flexibility, eroding 
protections afforded by more narrowly defined offences. 
 
D Attorney-General’s Responses to the Sheller 
Committee Report 
 
Attorney-General Ruddock’s responses to the Sheller Committee Report 
were notable for their unwillingness to seriously consider and implement 
recommendations intended to be protective of liberty and to refine safeguards 
against possible abuse of power. This minimal consideration of the 
recommendations is an inadequate response to such a high-profile Committee 
and its considered report.  
 
The then Attorney-General responded to the Sheller Committee report by 
first highlighting positives for the Howard government. These were that the 
Committee ‘recognised [that] the current level of threat to Australia and 
Australian interests from terrorist activity justified the continuing need for 
important counter-terrorism legislation.’38 It was further stated that ‘the report 
recognised that the current level of threat to Australia and Australian interests 
from terrorist activity justified the continuing need for our strong counter-
terrorism laws’39 and that ‘the report also found that there had been no 
excessive or improper use of Australia’s counter-terrorism laws’.40  
 
The response of Attorney-General Ruddock also asserted claims vindicating 
the Howard government’s position. These were that that ‘the current listing 
process (for proscription of terrorist organisations) contains sufficient 
safeguards, including judicial review and parliamentary oversight, and that it 
is more appropriate for the proscription power to be vested with the 
                                                
37 Section 100.1(3) creates a range of exempted action which will not constitute a terrorist act: 
‘Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) is advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action; 
and (b) is not intended (i) to cause serious harm that is physical harm to a person; or (ii) to 
cause a person’s death; or (iii) to endanger the life of a person, other than the person taking the 
action; or (iv) to create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public.’ 
38 Philip Ruddock, ‘Tabling of Security Legislation Review Committee Report’ (Press 
Release, 15 June 2006). 
39 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 June 2006, 38 
(Philip Ruddock). 
40 Ibid. 
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executive’41 and that ‘we do not believe that there is any justification for 
removing the association offence’.42 The response was directed to deflecting 
criticism within the Sheller Report of the terrorism legislation. It stated in 
neutral language that ‘the Government had formed preliminary views on a 
number of the Committee’s recommendations’,43 that the ‘Australian 
Government remains committed to engaging with the community on security 
issues’44 and that the government would comment on the review to the 
subsequent inquiry by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security.45  
 
This further inquiry, legislatively mandated, provided the Attorney-General 
with a breathing space afforded by subsequent Parliamentary Committee 
review, including a consideration of the recommendations of the Sheller 
Committee. What is most striking about all of this is the lack of urgency and 
immediacy with which implementation of the reforms suggested by the 
Committee was approached, reforms which would have provided additional 
checks and balances. This is in sharp contrast to the culture of urgency which 
was evident when additional powers and expanded executive discretions 
under new counter terrorism laws were sought. 
 
 
III PARLIAMENTARY JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 
AND SECURITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO SECURITY 
LEGISLATION REVIEW COMMITTEE REPORT ON REVIEW OF 
TERRORISM LEGISLATION 
 
As indicated, a major part of Attorney-General Ruddock’s response to the 
Sheller Committee Report deflected the criticism within it and defused the 
                                                
41 Ruddock, above n 38. 
42 Ibid. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 June 
2006, 38 (Philip Ruddock) ‘The government believes concern expressed by the committee 
about the offensive association is also unfounded’. 
43 Ruddock, above n 38. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. See further the letter from the Hon P Ruddock ‘Government comments on 
Recommendations of the Security Legislation Review Committee (the Sheller Review)’ 
06/7338 to Hon David Jull MP, Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security, with 14 attached pages of recommendations and comments. Key Findings and 
Comments available at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/pjcis/securityleg/subs/sub14.pdf > at 25 August 
2008 (Attorney-General’s Department Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence and Security Review of Security and Counter-Terrorism Legislation) (hereafter 
Comments on SLRC recommendations). 
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serious analysis of its findings by alluding to the then forthcoming review by 
the Parliamentary Joint Committee.46 This response implicitly anticipated a 
more favourable review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee, which had a 
government majority membership. The Howard government clearly indicated 
that it would be commenting on the Sheller Committee report. This additional 
opportunity afforded to the government was later used to reinforce existing 
executive conceptions of security and to refute and contain the suggested 
Sheller Committee reforms.  
 
A The Attorney-General’s Comments to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
Recommendations of the Sheller Committee Report 
 
The Attorney-General’s Comments on the Recommendations of the Security 
Legislation Review Committee (Sheller Review)47 are particularly 
noteworthy for the number of recommendations from the Sheller Committee 
which were either not supported or rejected, and for the predictable and 
formulaic language in which this was done. 
 
The recommendations not supported included: the recommendation that 
timetabled review of the legislation occur within three years and expanded 
review of the legislation within ten years by an independent reviewer;48 that 
the process of proscription of terrorist organisations be reformed;49 that 
paragraph (c) of section 102.1(1A) of the Criminal Code (Cth) be omitted 
from the definition of ‘advocates’ (the section providing that an organisation 
advocates the doing of a terrorist act where the organisation ‘directly praises 
                                                
46 The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security was required under the 
Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) s 29(1)(ba) to review the operation, effectiveness and 
implications of the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth), the Border 
Security Legislation Amendment Act 2002 (Cth), the Criminal Code Amendment (Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombings) Act 2002 (Cth), and the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 
2002 (Cth), and to make its report as soon as practicable after the third anniversary of the laws 
coming into force. Section 4 of the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 
(Cth) required the Parliamentary Joint Committee to take account of the Sheller Committee 
Report in conducting its own review. The Security Legislation Review Committee was 
required, within six months of commencing the review, to give the Attorney-General and the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD (now the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Intelligence and Security) a written report of the review which included an 
assessment of matters in section 4(1) and alternative approaches or mechanisms as appropriate. 
See Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) s 4 (6). See also Sheller 
Committee Report, above n 1, 19. 
47 See letter item 06/7338, Ruddock, above n 45. 
48 Point 1 in the Comments on SLRC recommendations, above n 45. 
49 Ibid Points 3 and 4.  
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the doing of a terrorist act in circumstances where there is a risk that such 
praise might have the effect of leading a person…to engage in a terrorist 
act’);50 that the burden of proof on a defendant under section 102.3(2) – 
requiring the defendant to prove that he or she took all reasonable steps to 
cease to be a member of a terrorist organisation as soon as practicable after 
the person knew that the organisation was a terrorist organisation – be 
changed from a legal burden to an evidential burden;51 that section 102.7 of 
the Criminal Code ‘providing support to a terrorist organisation’ be amended 
to ensure that ‘support’ cannot be construed to extend to the publication of 
views that appear to be favourable to a proscribed organisation and its stated 
objective;52 that section 102.8 of the Criminal Code ‘associating with terrorist 
organisations’ be repealed;53 that consideration be given to re-drafting section 
103.2(1)(b) ‘ of the Criminal Code to make clear a requirement that the 
intended recipient of funds is a terrorist’;54 and that the section 80.1(1)(f) 
Criminal Code offence of ‘conduct assisting another country or an 
organisation engaged in armed hostilities against the Australian Defence 
Force’ be amended to include as an element of the offence that the person 
knows that the other country or organisation is engaged in armed hostilities 
against the ADF.55 
 
In contrast, other recommendations by the Sheller Committee that were 
supported or not opposed by the government are elaborated upon, qualified or 
glossed in the Comments on the Recommendations of the Security Legislation 
Review Committee in a way that maximised support for the Howard 
government approach to enacting counter-terrorism laws. This response is 
clearly intended to vindicate and reinforce executive claims in counter-
terrorism laws. Some illustrative examples will suffice.  
 
In relation to a recommendation supporting greater community education and 
government explanation of terrorism legislation,56 the Howard government 
emphasised the non-discriminatory nature of the laws and the range of 
meetings and initiatives undertaken. Recommendations which would expand 
the scope of terrorism offences are readily approved in the Attorney-
General’s comments, two examples being the recommendation that 
psychological harm be included in the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in the 
                                                
50 Ibid Point 9. 
51 Ibid Point 11. 
52 Ibid Point 14. 
53 Ibid Point 15. 
54 Ibid Point 17. 
55 Ibid Point 18. 
56 Ibid Point 2. 
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Criminal Code (Cth)57 and that a separate offence of ‘threat of action’ or 
‘threat to commit a terrorist act’58 be given further consideration for inclusion 
in the Criminal Code (Cth). In contrast, the Attorney-General responded to 
the Committee’s recommendation that the definition of ‘terrorist act’ retain 
the requirement that the ‘action is done or the threat is made with the 
intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause’59 by simply 
noting the views of the Committee and indicating that the proposal would be 
given further consideration.60  
 
B The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security Response to the Sheller Committee 
Report 
 
If the Howard government’s strategy to defuse criticism of its counter-
terrorism legislation made by the Sheller Committee was to buy time, with 
the expectation of a more favourable subsequent report, then it failed to 
achieve that objective. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security, in its Review of Security and Counter-Terrorism Legislation,61 
endorsed ‘most of the recommendations of the Sheller Committee Report, 
tabled in June this year’.62 In particular, the two government proposals to 
simplify the definition of terrorism and thereby increase executive discretion 
and the application of terrorism offences were rejected.63 Recommendations 
were also made that the components of various existing terrorism offences be 
refined and modified.64 Similarly, the Committee recommended that ‘strict 
liability provisions applied to serious criminal offences that attract the 
penalty of imprisonment be reduced to an evidential burden’.65 
                                                
57 Ibid Point 7. 
58 Ibid Point 8. 
59 Ibid ‘Key Findings’. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, above n 2. 
62 House of Representatives Alert Service, ‘Intelligence Committee reports on Australia’s 
terrorism laws’ 4 December 2006. 
63 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, above n 2, Recommendation 7: 
‘The Committee recommends that the requirement that the person intends to advance a 
political, religious or ideological cause be retained as part of the definition of terrorism’; 
Recommendation 8: ‘The Committee recommends that the current exemption for advocacy, 
protest, dissent and industrial action be retained as part of the definition of terrorism’. 
64 Ibid Recommendation 15 (membership/participation in a terrorist organisation); 
Recommendation 16 (provision of or receipt of training from a terrorist organisation); 
Recommendation 17 (receiving funds from a terrorist organisation); Recommendation 18 
(providing support to a terrorist organisation); Recommendation 19 (associating with a 
terrorist organisation). 
65 Ibid Recommendation 20. 
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As well as these recommended reforms which would refine counter-terrorism 
offences and reduce executive discretion, the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
Report also recommended a major additional review mechanism. This 
recommendation was the creation of an Independent Reviewer of terrorism 
law.66 The Independent Reviewer would have a capacity to set priorities for 
ongoing review of terrorism legislation, and an obligation to report annually 
to Parliament, with the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security entrusted with the examination of the tabled reports of the 
Independent Reviewer.67 
 
C The Government Response to the Parliamentary 
 Joint Committee Report 
 
The Howard government’s response to the report of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee was muted. Parliamentary debate on the report was adjourned 
after the report was tabled by the Chair of the Committee on 4 December 
2006, with ‘resumption of the debate…[to] be made an order of the day for 
the next sitting’.68 The Chair of the Committee had only a few minutes to 
provide an outline of the report, with no further speakers participating.69 On 
16 August 2007, the House resolved that the ‘Order of the day will be 
removed from the Notice Paper unless re-accorded priority on the next sitting 
Monday after 17 September 2007’.70 Furthermore, at the time of release of 
the report in December 2006, the Attorney-General made no apparent 
reference to it in a media release or other media related communication.71 
 
It is also noteworthy that the government did not formally respond to the 
report within the prescribed period of three months.72 An interim response 
was made on 21 June 2007 indicating that ‘The government response is being 
                                                
66 Based on the UK independent reviewer: ‘In principle, the approach in the UK serves as a 
useful reference point for the development of an Australian model’: ibid 21. 
67 Ibid Recommendation 2. 
68 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 4 December 2006, 11 
(Deputy Speaker I R Causley). 
69 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 4 December 2006, 9-11 
(Hon David Jull). The report was also presented to the Senate: see Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 4 December 2006, 51 (Senator Ferris). 
70 Commonwealth, Notice Paper, House of Representatives, 16 August 2007. 
71 As indicated by the then extant Attorney-General Ruddock’s website: Media Centre 
Information. 
72 See Commonwealth, Hansard, Senate, 21 June 2007 (Committees: Reports Responses). 
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considered and will be tabled in due course’.73 Further circumstantial 
evidence suggests that the government position, consistent with earlier views 
and submissions, was unlikely to be supportive of the Sheller and 
Parliamentary Joint Committee reforms.74 
 
Importantly, these detailed and considered reform recommendations, drawing 
upon extensive expert advice and submissions, and with the subsequent 
endorsement by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and 
Security of most aspects of the initial Sheller Committee findings, received 
little or no government attention, nor was any confirmation made by the 
government that the recommendations would be implemented. The inertia 
and lassitude in relation to these recommendations is striking in contrast to 
both the culture of urgency cultivated by the Attorney-General in the passage 
of executive power enhancing terrorism legislation, and in relation to the 
sheer volume of terrorism legislation passed by the Commonwealth 
Parliament since 2001.75 An obvious conclusion is that the considered 




IV ANTI-TERRORISM ACT (NO 2) 2005: SEDITION ASPECTS 




A Background and Context for the Senate Committee 
 Inquiry 
 
The reform of the offence of sedition under Commonwealth law was, along 
with the introduction of control orders and preventative detention, one of 
                                                
73 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 21 June 2007, 93 
(Speaker of the House); and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 21 June 2007, 
110 (Senator Eric Abetz). 
74 Two examples from the Parliamentary Joint Committee report stand out: see Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, above n 2, 15, para 2.39: ‘The Attorney-
General’s Department argued that the Senate Legal and Constitutional and Legislation 
Committee gave extensive consideration to the legislation in 2002. In their view, further 
refinements are appropriate only if there are demonstrable ‘problems’ with the legislation’; 
ibid 20, para 2.59: ‘AGD suggested that the parliamentary committee system is more inclusive 
and effective than an individual reviewer’. 
75 See the listing of the numerous pieces of legislation on the Parliamentary Library website: 
Parliamentary Library, Terrorism Law Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/law/terrorism.htm#terrchron> at 22 August 2008. 
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several controversial measures in the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth).76 
The consideration of the sedition aspects of the bill provides further insights 
into the nature of the urgency claim, its executive orientation and the 
additional reluctance to implement considered and broadly based 
recommendations from review committees relating to sedition. It again 
demonstrates, both in process and outcome, the highly political applications 
of terrorism law reform, with considered committee review recommendations 
being marginalised. In particular, the time constraints within which the 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee conducted its inquiry 
into the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Cth) produced significant 
consequences for how the legislative and review processes of the sedition 
offence were carried out. Importantly, the inquiry was to be conducted and 
the bill passed in the new environment created by the Howard government 
having unexpectedly obtained control of the Senate from 1 July 2005, 
following the October 2004 election.77 
 
On 3 November 2005, a reporting date of 28 November 2005 for the inquiry 
into the then bill by the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee was determined.78 The Senate Committee sought submissions on 
5 November 2005, allowing 6 days for submission by the closing date of 11 
November 2005. The Committee received 294 submissions and a number of 
supplementary submissions79 and conducted two and a half days of public 
hearings.80 The Committee hearings were noteworthy for the intensity of the 
work and the number of senators participating.81 Only a few days were 
available for the writing of the report, with obvious adverse consequences for 
                                                
76 For discussion of other controversial measures, including control orders and preventative 
detention, in the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) see Andrew Lynch and Alexander 
Reilly, ‘The Constitutional Validity of Terrorism Orders of Control and Preventative 
Detention’ (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 105 and Carne, ‘Prevent, Detain, 
Control and Order’, above n 7. 
77 See the discussion of the consequences of this renewed executive control in Halligan, Miller 
and Power, above n 16, 255-9. 
78 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 November 2005, 61-2 (Acting Deputy 
President Senator Ross Lightfoot). 
79 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 3, 1. 
80 In general terms, important ‘issues centre on what types of references are allowed to get up 
and the extent to which the witnesses are allowed and encouraged to appear before public 
committee meetings (as opposed to submitting written statements)’: Halligan, Miller and 
Power, above n 16, 257. 
81 See comments by Chair of the Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 November 2005, 69 (Senator Marise 
Payne); and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 6 (Senator 
Marise Payne). 
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the quality of writing and the extent of the research base for the report.82 
Several senators were critical of this review process, citing democratic deficit 
issues relating to it.83 It was subsequently claimed by the Chair of the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee that many of the Committee 
recommendations were adopted in the bill and legislation,84 but that claim is 
readily contestable.  
 
The legislation passed the Senate on 6 December 2005. A commitment was 
given by Attorney-General Ruddock that, following enactment, the sedition 
aspects would be referred for review by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission.85 The Attorney-General formally referred the provisions for 
review by the ALRC on 2 March 2006.86 
 
The culture of urgency of legislative enactment has a particular twist in 
relation to the sedition provisions. Whilst some serious recommendations 
were raised in the Senate Committee Report in relation to review and reform 
of the bill’s sedition provisions,87 these same identifiably flawed and 
objectionable provisions were nonetheless enacted. The premises inherent in 
this approach are simply that the drafting mandated by the Attorney-
General’s department was in no immediate need of improvement or 
modification. This meant that, even if it could be shown that it was wise to 
                                                
82 Halligan, Miller and Power observe that following the Howard government Senate majority 
from 1 July 2005 ‘The time offered to committees to report on bills has been cut by thirty per 
cent’: Halligan, Miller and Power, above n 16, 256. 
83 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 November 2005, 70 (Senator Trisha 
Crossin) and 71 (Senator Natasha Stott Despoja); Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 5 December 2005, 12 (Senator Natasha Stott Despoja), 4-5 (Senator Chris Evans) and 
18 (Senator Joe Ludwig). 
84 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 7 (Senator Marise 
Payne): ‘As I mentioned when tabling the committee report on Monday of last week, the 
committee made 52 recommendations, and many were in fact procedural 
recommendations…The committee considered those matters and, as I said, made a number of 
suggestions and recommendations. The overwhelming majority of those have been taken up’.  
85 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 November 2005, 103 
(Hon Philip Ruddock): ‘Given considerable interest in the provisions, I would like to assure 
this House that I will undertake to conduct with my department a review of the sedition 
offences’; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 November 
2005, 88 (Hon Philip Ruddock): ‘I have given an undertaking to my colleagues and to the 
parliament to have a look next year and to review the sedition provisions to further update, if 
necessary, the language used to describe them’. 
86 See Philip Ruddock, ‘Australian Law Reform Commission to Review Sedition Laws’ (Press 
Release 2 March 2006) with attachment ‘Review of Sedition Laws’ setting out the terms of 
reference. 
87 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 3, Recommendations 27-9, 
and pp 73-131. 
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amend the bill, it was desirable to enact flawed legislation immediately, and 
to consider any amendments in the future. The granting of a review of the bill 
and its timing were at the discretion of the Attorney-General. The course of 
removing Schedule 7 from the Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005 (Cth), referring the 
matter to the Australian Law Reform Commission, and subsequently drafting 
proposed legislation in conformity with ALRC recommendations was 
rejected. 
 
B Government Submissions to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Committee Inquiry 
 
Illuminating of the concentration of executive power and urgency themes in 
Attorney-General Ruddock’s approach are both the written and oral 
submissions made by government parties to the Senate Committee inquiry. A 
good example is the insistence by the Attorney-General’s Department that the 
relevant sedition offences required an intentional (as distinct from reckless) 
urging of the relevant conduct,88 as the urging is a conduct element of the 
offence. This argument was based on the operation of section 5(6) of the 
Criminal Code (Cth).89 This technically based argument, whilst correct, fails 
to address the chilling effect within the broader, non legal community of not 
clearly identifying the limits of permissible speech within the context of a 
                                                
88 Namely, the overthrow by force or violence of (a) the Constitution (b) the Government of 
the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory; or (c) the lawful authority of the Government of the 
Commonwealth: s 80.2(1); the interference by force or violence with lawful processes for an 
election of a member or members of a House of the Parliament: s 80.2(3); for a group or 
groups (whether distinguished by race, religion, nationality or political opinion) to use force or 
violence against another group or groups (as so distinguished) if (b) the use of force or 
violence would threaten the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth: s 
80.2(5). 
89 The Criminal Code (Cth) s 5(6) states that: (1) If the law creating the offence does not 
specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the 
fault element for that physical element; (2) If the law creating the offence does not specify a 
fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is 
the fault element for that physical element. See also Attorney-General’s Department 
Submission 1 to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee Inquiry into provisions of the 
Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Submission 290) (hereafter Submission 290), 5: ‘Like the 
incitement offences, the prosecution must prove that the person intended to urge the conduct. 
As mentioned above, “urging” is intentional because it is a conduct element of the offence’; 
and Attorney-General’s Department Submission 2 to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee Inquiry into provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Bill (No 2) 2005 (Submission 290A) 
(hereafter Submission 290A), 19: ‘Like the incitement offences the prosecution must prove 
that the person intended to urge the conduct. As mentioned above, “urging” is intentional 
because it is a conduct element of the offence.’ 
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serious criminal offence.90 That offence carries the label ‘sedition’, with all of 
its historical connotations. Indeed, sedition as a criminal offence was argued 
by the Attorney-General’s Department to be far from an anachronistic 
offence, and indeed was an offence made particularly relevant by new 
information technology.91 
 
A further unwillingness to seriously entertain major amendments (including 
an alternative offence) contemporaneous with debate and passage of the bill 
is confirmed by the deliberate assertion of executive authority to enact the 
law according to a pre-determined timetable.92 An assumed broader objective 
of counter-terrorism law, the protection of liberal-democratic values of 
freedom of expression, was likewise challenged by the rejection of defences 
protecting an expanded range of expression. The inclusion of such defences 
would have promoted the protection of those values.93 The executive-inspired 
orientation of the sedition provisions is further corroborated in remarks by 
the Attorney-General’s department about a lack of public and other 
consultation – specifically with media and privacy groups – during the 
development of the sedition provisions of the bill,94 admitting that 
consultation was confined to government type bodies.95 
                                                
90 The prescribed penalty for each of the sedition offences in Section 80.2 is imprisonment for 
7 years. 
91 Submission 290A, above n 89, 2: ‘My starting point is that in recent years sedition has 
become a more relevant offence. The web and computer technology has made it much easier to 
disseminate material that urges violence …Indeed it may be that some of the people who gave 
testimony to the Committee may not be as in touch as the law enforcement and security and 
intelligence services are in understanding the penetration of the web amongst young people’. 
92 See comments in Commonwealth, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee 
Hansard, Senate, 18 November 2005, 33-34 (Geoff McDonald, Attorney-General’s 
Department): ‘What you are proposing is to start ... a new, individual offence in this area, and 
to then try to get the approval of the states of that offence, because we rely on a reference of 
power whenever we refer to a terrorist act. With sedition, of course, that is within the 
Commonwealth’s power and we do not need to get their approval for that. So it would be very 
difficult to meet the Prime Minister’s and the Attorney-General’s timetable to have adequate 
laws in place before Christmas by starting from scratch with the individual offence…With the 
sedition offence that we have put together, we got our drafting instructions in early September 
and we have developed it over that period…Trying to do this individual offence on the run in 
the next week or so would be very difficult.’  
93 Submission 290A, above n 89, 4: ‘HREOC suggested that there be special defences for 
educational, artistic and journalistic works…The danger with using special defences is that the 
terrorists will attempt to use education, the arts and journalism as a shield for their activities.’ 
94 Submission 290A, above n 89, Attachment B, 25: ‘…there was no formal public exposure of 
the Bill. This was due of the considerable time constraints under which the Bill was developed. 
However, as mentioned every effort that was possible to be taken was taken to consult on the 
content of the Bill. The Government consulted with the Commonwealth and State agencies 
during the development of the Bill, including the Privacy area of the Attorney-General’s 
Department, and the Privacy Commissioner was briefed about the Bill, including the sedition 
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A common theme in each of these instances was the Howard government’s 
certainty of the correctness of its position and the unwillingness to concede 
ground through adopting amendments, even those amendments raised in 
Committee dialogue by its own backbenchers.96 
 
C The Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee 
Recommendations 
 
Importantly, the bi-partisan Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee reached consensus on recommendations relating to the sedition 
provisions of the bill, its recommendations being contrary to the views of the 
government. First, the Committee recommended that Schedule 7 be removed 
from the bill completely.97 It further recommended ‘that the Australian Law 
Reform Commission conduct a public inquiry into the appropriate legislative 
vehicle for addressing the issue of incitement to terrorism. This review 
should examine, amongst other matters, the need for sedition provisions such 
as those contained in Schedule 7...’.98 In the event that Schedule 7 was not 
removed from the bill, the Committee recommended alternative amendments 
which would have reduced the potential reach of the sedition offences and 





                                                                                                               
provisions. No media or privacy groups were formally consulted regarding the proposed 
amendments to the sedition provisions’. 
95 Including the Australian Federal Police: See Commonwealth, Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee Hansard, Senate, 17 November 2005, 96 (Federal Agent 
Colvin, Australian Federal Police): ‘The sedition offences are the result of discussions that we 
have had with the department in terms of vulnerabilities and gaps that we saw in relation to 
operations that we were conducting around incitement...’ 
96 See for example, the comments of Senators Mason and Brandis, Commonwealth, Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Committee Hansard, Senate, 18 November 2005, 22-24.  
97 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 3, 115, Recommendation 
27.  
98 Ibid 115, Recommendation 28. 
99 Ibid 115-116, Recommendation 29: ‘all offences in proposed section 80.2 should be 
amended to expressly require intentional urging’ and ‘proposed section 80.3 (the defence for 
acts done ‘in good faith’) in Schedule 7 be amended to remove the words “in good faith” and 
extend the defence to include statements for journalistic, educational, artistic, scientific, 
religious or public interest purposes (along the lines of the defence in section 18D of the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975)’ and further that ‘proposed subsections 80.2(7) and 80.2(8) in 
Schedule 7 be amended to require a link to force or violence and to remove the phrase “by any 
means whatever”’. Only the final aspect – ‘by any means whatever’ – was deleted from the 
bill. 
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D The Attorney General’s Moves to Swift Enactment 
of the Bill 
 
However, consistent with the views communicated by the Department in 
written and oral submissions before the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee, the Attorney-General confirmed two important points 
in parliamentary debates on the bill. The first was a commitment to review 
the sedition offences.100 Strikingly, this was without a commitment to 
implement the findings of the review body, if, for example, those prospective 
findings supported the findings of the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Legislation Committee. The second related to the timing of that review, 
which was to occur after the passage of the existing bill.101 In particular, this 
latter aspect was justified on the now familiar bases of the satisfactory nature 
of the existing drafting102 and the urgency of the need to have revised sedition 
measures in place.103 
 
Subsequently the bill, including the sedition provisions, was passed with 
considerable speed. The speed was particularly remarkable as the bill 
included two other major and controversial measures, namely control orders 
and preventative detention. The third reading of the bill occurred on 29 
November 2005, the House of Representatives then adjourning. Debate on 
the second reading of the bill in the Senate occurred on 30 November 2005 
(for incorporation of the second reading speech in Hansard) and debate 
resumed on 5 December 2005, with one and a half hours of debate initially 
                                                
100 See comments in Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 3 
November 2005, 103 (Hon Philip Ruddock); and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 29 November 2005, 88 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
101 See especially Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 
November 2005, 93-94 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
102 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 November 
2005, 88 (Hon Philip Ruddock): ‘…to review the sedition provisions to further update, if 
necessary, the language used to describe them. That does not suggest that the measures 
themselves are inappropriate, and that is why I argue very strongly that they ought to continue 
in their present form in the bill, which is preferable to the form in which they are in the present 
law’. 
103 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 November 
2005, 93 (Hon Philip Ruddock): ‘So I do not think there is a basis upon which you can say, 
‘we will put this off and come back to it’…No, in my view it is important to have in place now 
provisions that make it clear it is an offence if a person urges another person to overthrow, by 
force or violence, our democratic institutions’; and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, 29 November 2005, 100 (Hon Philip Ruddock): ‘…the government 
would be arguing very strongly that this is a measure which is needed now…I think there is 
some urgency in relation to these measures. I do not think it is a matter that we can leave 
unaddressed until we come back next year, particularly in the context of the wide range of 
issues that are involved.’ 
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being made available.104 On the evening of 5 December 2005, the bill was 
declared an urgent bill by government motion, allowing only an additional 
four and a half hours of debate on all of the bill’s schedules, including all the 
remaining second reading and committee stages.105 The bill passed the Senate 
on the evening of 6 December 2005106 and a message was received from the 
House of Representatives agreeing to the Senate amendments on 8 December 
2005.107 This timeline, reflective of the urgency aspects highlighted in the 
preceding discussion, may be contrasted with the extended use of Senate time 
for other purposes, including government filibustering on other bills, on the 
last 2005 sitting day,108 to achieve a specific political objective.109 
 
 
V AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION REVIEW OF THE 
SEDITION PROVISIONS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT 
(NO 2) 2005 
 
Attorney-General Ruddock’s undertaking to have the sedition provisions 
reviewed after passage of the bill was followed up through his announcement 
that ‘the Australian Law Reform Commission will review Schedule 7 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005’,110 with a reporting date no later than 30 
May 2006.111 
 
The interval between the announcement and the reporting date is made 
noteworthy by the fact that a minor political skirmish erupted around 
Opposition criticism of the new sedition laws, with the Attorney-General 
                                                
104 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 1-22. 
105 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 2005, 81, 85-6. 
106 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 6 December 2005, 116. 
107 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 8 December 2005, 135. 
108 9 December 2005. 
109 Such objective being obtaining the casting vote of Senator Fielding on voluntary student 
unionism, namely the Higher Education Support Amendment (Abolition of Compulsory 
Upfront Union Fees) Act 2005 (Cth). 
110 Philip Ruddock, ‘Australian Law Reform Commission to Review Sedition Laws’ and 
Attachment ‘Review of Sedition Laws’, (Press Release 2 March 2006), listing the terms of 
reference, including consideration of (a) whether the amendments in Schedule 7 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth), including the sedition offence and defences in sections 80.2 
and 80.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), effectively address the problem of urging the 
use of force or violence; (b) whether ‘sedition’ is the appropriate term to identify this conduct 
(d) any related matter. 
111 For a discussion of the ALRC review of the sedition provisions, see Kate Connors, ‘Review 
of federal sedition laws’ (2006) 88 Reform 60; Kate Connors, ‘Fighting words: The ALRC’s 
Review of Federal Sedition Laws’(2006) 89 Reform 73; and Bronitt and Stellios, above n 8. 
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claiming that such criticism misrepresented the laws.112 Whether or not that 
was the case, the matter illustrates the adaptability of the ongoing sedition 
issue for partisan political ends, as well as a re-assertion of executive 
authority in matters concerning the correctness of the content and formulation 
of the new sedition offences.113 
 
A The Australian Law Reform Commission Report 
on Sedition 
 
The ALRC Report is noteworthy for its substantial endorsement of the 
substance of the Senate Committee’s recommendations regarding sedition. Its 
recommendations on this matter are carefully constructed and ordinarily 
would be unremarkable. The failure to swiftly implement them – to treat 
them as an urgent legislative item – says much about the utility of deferred 
review following enactment, and about a Howard government ranking of 
different forms of review as having different levels of credibility114 in which 
government legislative drafting is preferred over the versions endorsed by the 
review bodies.  
 
The ALRC Report made a number of significant recommendations in relation 
to sedition.115 It recommended that the term ‘sedition’ should be removed 
from the Criminal Code (Cth) and in particular that section 80.2 should have 
a new heading, ‘Urging political or inter-group force or violence’.116 Two 
major reasons were advanced for the change in wording – that the bill’s 
amendments meant that the term ‘sedition’ no longer accurately identified the 
section 80.2 offences117 and that use of the word ‘sedition’ has an unfortunate 
history relating to the suppression of criticism of established authority.118 
 
More particularly, the Report recommended that the section 80.2(1) offence 
should be changed to refer to urging the overthrow by force or violence of the 
                                                
112 Philip Ruddock, ‘Labor’s Support of Sedition Laws: Too Little, Too Late’ (Press Release 
16 May 2006); and Philip Ruddock, ‘Labor Continues Dishonest Campaign despite Backflip 
on Sedition’ (Press Release 29 May 2006). 
113 This was particularly evident in the emphasis in the media releases above of the urging of 
force and violence. 
114 This hierarchy of review credibility is discussed in relation to the other major components 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act No 2 (2005) (Cth), namely control orders and preventative detention, 
in Carne, ‘Prevent, Detain, Control and Order’, above n 7, 43-9.  
115 For a summary and overview of the recommended reforms, see Connors, above n 111, 73.  
116 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 4, 67, Recommendation 2-1. 
117 Ibid 66.  
118 Ibid 66-7; Connors, above n 111, 74. 
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Constitution or government.119 Furthermore, it recommended that the section 
80.2(3) offence should be changed to refer to urging interference in 
parliamentary elections by force or violence.120 Similarly, it recommended 
that the section 80.2(5) offence heading should be changed to refer to urging 
inter-group force or violence.121 
 
The ALRC also reached the conclusion that a sedition-type offence was 
necessary because, by contrast, incitement offences required the 
identification of a defined offence actually incited to be committed. In other 
words, ‘the new sedition offences were framed to avoid any need for a 
connection between urging and a specific terrorist act or other crime’.122 The 
justification for this lack of specificity ‘relies on their coverage of general 
exhortations to use force or violence for broadly political or anti-social 
ends’.123 Though accepting the justification for this broader offence, the 
ALRC was of the opinion ‘that there should be a more concrete link between 
the offences in section 80.2 and the use of force or violence’,124 particularly 
given the seriousness of the offences.125 It was stated therefore that ‘[s]ection 
80.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) should be amended to provide that for a 
person to be guilty of the offences under section 80.2, the person must intend 
that the urged force or violence will occur’.126 Related to this 
recommendation is the ALRC’s acceptance that the analysis by the Attorney-
General’s Department of the fault element in the sedition offences in section 
80.2(1), (3) and (5) of the Criminal Code as requiring intention is correct.127 
However, additional arguments are advanced by the ALRC to bolster the 
inclusion of the word ‘intentionally’ in section 80.2.128  
                                                
119 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 4, 190 and Recommendation 9-1, 191. 
120 Ibid 193 and 194, Recommendation 9-4. 
121 Ibid 222, Recommendation 10-1. 
122 Ibid 174. ‘A central rationale for the sedition offences is that this particular form of ‘urging’ 
presents such serious risks to public safety and the body politic that it should be punishable 




125 Ibid 175. 
126 Ibid 176, Recommendation 8-1. 
127 Ibid 177. This approach is based upon Criminal Code (Cth) s 5.6, stating that ‘(1) If the law 
creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only 
of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.’ 
128 These are the importance of clear community understanding of the law to prevent chilling 
of expression, and the fact that reliance upon the default provision of s 5.6 of the Criminal 
Code is not exclusive, in that a variety of Criminal Code offences include the word 
‘intentionally’: Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 4, 180. A later argument is that 
recommending that ‘the person must intend that the urged force or violence will occur 
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The existing defence for acts done in good faith under sections 80.1 and 80.2 
was also the subject of major recommendations. The ALRC recommended 
that the good faith defences should not apply to the section 80.2 offence. It 
was further recommended that, in determining whether a person intends that 
force or violence will occur for the purpose of the offences under section 
80.2(1), (3) and (5), the trier of fact must have regard to the context in which 
the conduct occurred.129 In order to reinforce the contextual element relating 
to proof of intention that the force or violence urged will occur, the report 
recommended that a note should be included after each of the section 80.2(1), 
(3) and (5) offences.130 
 
B The Attorney-General’s Response to the ALRC 
Sedition Report 
 
The release of the ALRC report on sedition was, however, presented by 
Attorney-General Ruddock as an endorsement by the ALRC of the 
government’s approach,131 with only a statement that ‘the Government would 
give careful consideration to the Commission’s report as part of its ongoing 
commitment to ensure that there are appropriate Commonwealth offences to 
deal with such conduct’.132 This initial muted response was a precursor of 
subsequent government inaction on the report recommendations. 
 
The ALRC report was actually tabled in the House of Representatives by the 
Leader of Government Business,133 and debate immediately adjourned. 
Subsequent Howard government contribution to debate on the report was 
                                                                                                               
addresses, albeit in an indirect way, concerns about the need for a closer connection between 
the urging and an increased likelihood of violence eventuating’: ibid 185. 
129 Ibid 260, and Recommendation 12-2, 261. The relevant contexts in which the conduct 
occurs are: (a) in the development, performance, exhibition or distribution of an artistic work; 
or (b) in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held for any 
genuine academic, artistic or scientific purpose or any other genuine purpose in the public 
interest; or (c) in connection with an industrial dispute or an industrial matter; or (d) in the 
dissemination of news or current affairs. 
130 Ibid 262, and Recommendation 12-3, 262. The note would read ‘See section 80.2(7) 
regarding proof of intention that the urged force or violence will occur’: Ibid Appendix 2, 284. 
131 See Philip Ruddock, ‘ALRC Report on Sedition Laws Tabled’ (Press Release 13 September 
2006): ‘After undertaking widespread public consultation, the Australian Law Reform 
Commission recognised the need to have these types of offences…The Commission 
recognised that by modernising the offences, the Government had sensibly shifted the focus 
away from critical statements to conduct urging others to use force or violence to overthrow 
the government or to target particular groups within the community’. 
132 Ibid. 
133 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 13 September 
2006, 83-84 (Hon Tony Abbott). 
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extremely limited. Senator Brandis, on 18 October 2006,134 described the 
report as ‘a fine piece of work, carrying further and contemporizing the work 
of the Gibbs review of Commonwealth criminal law…I urge the government 
to adopt its recommendations and to give effect to them’.135 This followed 
debate on the report by several members of the Opposition.136 The matter was 




VI RECONSIDERING THE CONCEPT AND MEANING OF 
 URGENCY FOLLOWING THE SENATE LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE AND ALRC 
REVIEWS OF THE SEDITION LEGISLATION 
 
It is particularly significant, given the language and culture of urgency in 
counter-terrorism legislative matters - with two substantial consecutive 
reports advocating common reforms to the newly enacted sedition offences, 
and with the reason for swiftly enacting the sedition provisions justified 
partly on the basis that there would be subsequent review - that little, if 
anything, was subsequently acted upon by the Howard government in re-
drafting the sedition provisions. That significance is deepened by the fact that 
this present example repeats the government’s earlier failure to act upon the 
significant recommendations in the consecutive reports of the Security 
Legislation Review Committee and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Intelligence Services, which reviewed other counter-terrorism legislation. 
Some preliminary observations can therefore be made about the uses and 
                                                
134 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate 18 October 2006, 56 (Senator George 
Brandis). It was noteworthy that the Attorney-General spoke on some matters relating to 
terrorism in the House of Representatives on 10 October 2006, but did not engage with the 
ALRC report on sedition: see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 10 October 2006, 34 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
135 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 October 2006, 58 (Senator George 
Brandis). 
136 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 October 2006, 
140 (Nicola Roxon), 144 (Peter Garrett), 148 (Bob McMullan), 151 (Daryl Melham); 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 12 October 2006, 162 (Senator Carol Brown) 
and 85 (Senator Dana Wortley) and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 
November 2006, 127 (Senator Dana Wortley). 
137 See Commonwealth, Notice Paper, House of Representatives, 19 September 2007: 
regarding resumption of debate from 9 October 2006, the motion accepted ‘That the House 
take note of the document’. The Opposition pledged on 17 September 2007 to remove the 
word ‘sedition’ from the offences if elected to government: Lachlan Heywood, ‘Axe pledge on 
sedition’, Courier Mail (Brisbane) 17 September 2007, 14. 
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applications of urgency in the coalition government’s counter-terrorism 
legislative agenda. 
 
The raising of the issue of urgency in counter-terrorism law reform by the 
Howard government was contextual and relative. The situations identified 
show that urgency was an executive-determined and selectively applied 
concept, used to create momentum and force outcomes implementing an 
executive-driven legislative agenda. In sharp contrast, urgency was irrelevant 
in propelling any legislative reform arising from parliamentary or other 
review of elements of that legislative agenda and went unmentioned in that 
context. The urgency paradigm only applied to an executive-drafted bill 
which the executive found satisfactory in its current manifestation, which 
would not admit of any significant revision prior to enactment. Thus, the 
urgency paradigm ranked non-executive analysis and the recommended 
improvement of draft provisions, both before and after enactment, as 
significantly inferior to improvements or analysis approved by the executive, 
but failed to do so on any objective criteria. The urgency paradigm was as 
much a device to enable the executive to be seen to be acting decisively in a 
legislative sense, as it was a device to exert political pressure upon non-
government parties and obtain political advantage. 
 
 
VII THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION AMENDMENT 
 BILL 2006 – THE SENATE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
 LEGISLATION COMMITTEE REPORT 
 
Distinctive variations of the urgency claim emerged in the enactment of the 
Telecommunications Interception Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) and the 
Howard government’s response to the report on the bill by the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report.  
 
Significantly, the issue of urgency arose where the expansion of executive 
power relating to counter-terrorism involved the ASIO intelligence-gathering 
context of persons not suspected of involvement in terrorism and relating to 
what are known as B party communications (that is, electronic 
communications of a person known to communicate with the person of 
interest) and in the context of access to stored communications (such as e-
mails and text messages). There were differences of opinion about the level 
of sensitivity of the information to be accessed, based on a distinction 
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between stored communications information and real time 
communications.138  
 
The Telecommunications Interception Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) was 
introduced to the House of Representatives on 16 February 2006 and passed 
the House on 1 March 2006. The range of usual assurances given by the 
Attorney-General in the second reading debate about the necessity and 
balance of the legislation139 might be interpreted as a precursor to the 
government subsequently refusing to significantly amend the legislation in a 
manner consistent with subsequent Senate Committee recommendations.140  
 
A The Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
 Committee Recommendations 
 
The Senate Committee report141 was tabled on 27 March 2006.142 It 
recommended a range of significant changes to the bill’s B-party 
communications interception regime and to the stored communications 
regime, the two most pressing issues in the bill as far as counter-terrorism 
intelligence gathering is concerned. A summary of these matters will provide 
a useful basis for analysis of the urgency aspect and concentration of 
executive power manifested in subsequent debate about the bill. 
 
The stored communications regime was incorporated into ASIO’s 
telecommunications interception warrant regime.143 Importantly, the warrant 
                                                
138 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 5, 11.  
139 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 1 March 2006, 12-
13 (Hon Philip Ruddock). Emphasis was placed on the claim that ‘Interception under these 
new amendments will only be used as an investigative tool of last resort. I think that is the 
point that needs to be understood. These are additional controls. They are strict controls.’ 
140 Whilst claiming that a number of Committee recommendations were adopted, the 
government’s own Government Response to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee Report on the Provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 
2006 (Cth) indicates a large number of recommendations as not accepted. 
141 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 5. 
142 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 March 2006, 80 (Senator 
Eggleston). 
143 The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) Part 2-2 was amended 
so that ASIO was given access to stored communications as part of its warranted 
communications interception regime: see s 9A(1A). ‘The reference in paragraph (1)(b) to the 
interception of communications made to or from a telecommunications service includes a 
reference to the accessing of the communications as stored communications after they have 
ceased to pass over a telecommunications system.’ See also s 109: Access to stored 
communications under Part 2-2 warrants: ‘In addition to authorizing the interception of 
communications, a Part 2-2 warrant also authorises a person to access a stored communication 
if (a) the warrant would have authorized interception of the communication if it were still 
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authority criteria for access to stored communications are predicated upon 
security considerations144 and do not incorporate a further range of criteria for 
the issuing authority to consider when deciding whether to grant warrant 
access to stored communications to law enforcement authorities.145 The only 
comparable additional criteria in relation to ASIO telecommunications 
interception warrants apply solely in relation to B-party communications, 
where the person sending to or receiving from a telecommunications service 
is not engaged in and cannot reasonably be suspected of being engaged in 
activities prejudicial to security.146 No Senate Committee recommendations 
related directly or specifically to ASIO use of stored communication 
warrants.147 
 
In contrast, the Senate Committee examined the matter of the issue of B-party 
interception warrants on application from the Director General of ASIO, 
focusing upon two particular aspects – the issuing authority for the 
warrants148 and the threshold criteria for issuing the warrant.149 In particular, 
                                                                                                               
passing over a telecommunications system; and (b) the person is approved under section 12 in 
respect of the warrant.’ 
144 See the interrelationship of the security-based criteria in section 9(1)(a) and (b) of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) with section 9A(1C) of the Act 
which states ‘the reference in paragraph (1)(b) to the interception of communications made to 
or from a telecommunications service includes a reference to the accessing of the 
communications as stored communications after they have ceased to pass over a 
telecommunications system’. 
145 See Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 116(2): ‘(a) how much 
the privacy of any person or persons would be likely to be interfered with by accessing those 
stored communications under a stored communications warrant; and (b) the gravity of the 
conduct constituting the serious contravention; and (c) how much the information referred to 
in paragraph (1)(d) would be likely to assist in connection with the investigation; and (d) to 
what extent methods of investigating the serious contravention that do not involve the use of a 
stored communications warrant in relation to the person have been used by or are available to, 
the agency; and (e) how much the use of such methods would be likely to assist in connection 
with the investigation by the agency of the serious contravention; and (f) how much the use of 
such methods would be likely to prejudice the investigation by the agency of the serious 
contravention, whether because of the delay or for any other reason.’ 
146 See Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 9(3): ‘The Attorney-
General must not issue a warrant [in the situation described in the text] …unless he or she is 
satisfied that (a) the Organisation has exhausted all other practicable methods of identifying 
the telecommunications services used, or likely to be used, by the other person referred to in 
subparagraph (1)(a)(ia); or (b) interception of communications made to or from a 
telecommunications service used or likely to be used by that person would not otherwise be 
possible’. 
147 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 5, Chapter 3 Stored 
Communications. 
148 Ibid 33. 
149 Ibid 33-34. 
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the loose criteria for the B-party warrant, enabling ASIO to obtain 
intelligence relating to security, was of concern to the Committee, extending 
as it does to the interception of and access to telecommunications services of 
persons not involved, nor suspected of involvement, in activities prejudicial 
to security.  
 
All that is required under the now enacted provisions is that a 
telecommunications service (which includes stored communications) is, or is 
likely to be, the means by which the non-suspected person receives a 
communication from or sends a communication to another person who is 
engaged in, is reasonably suspected of being engaged in, or is likely to 
engage in, activities prejudicial to security – and that the interception or 
accessing of such communications will, or is likely to, assist ASIO in its 
function of obtaining intelligence relating to security.150 The Senate 
Committee noted that such powers ‘potentially allow ASIO to engage in the 
kind of “fishing expeditions” of which the Blunn report warned…[T]he 
proposal involves access to material generated by innocent persons, and must 
be circumscribed as far as possible to protect their privacy’.151  
 
The Senate Committee report then recommended that, as a precondition to 
issuing a warrant under section 9(3), there must be evidence that the B-
party’s telecommunications service is likely to be used to communicate or 
receive information relevant to the particular activities prejudicial to security 
which triggered the warrant.152 This recommendation was rejected by the 
government,153 with the existing drafting defended on the basis of the 
inclusion of the requirements of section 9(3)154 and the particular applications 
of this type of warrant.155 
                                                
150 See Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 9(1)(a)(i), (ia) and (ii). 
151 Ibid 34. 
152 Ibid 35, Recommendation 18. 
153 Government Response to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report on 
the provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2006. 
154 See Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 9(3): ‘The Attorney-
General must not issue a warrant in a case in which subparagraph (1)(a)(ia) applies unless he 
or she is satisfied that (a) the Organisation has exhausted all other practicable methods of 
identifying the telecommunications services used, or likely to be used, by the other person 
referred to in subparagraph (1)(a)(ia); or (b) interception of communications made to or from a 
telecommunications service used or likely to be used by that person would not otherwise be 
possible’. 
155 Namely, the interception of the B-party’s service in order to identify the unidentified target 
service of the intelligence target: the Government claimed that ‘It would unnecessarily limit 
the effective use of this provision to restrict the availability of such warrants to circumstances 
where the target is using the B-party to communicate or receive information directly relevant 
to the activities of concern’: Government Response to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
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The Senate Committee also looked at the reporting and accountability 
requirements of B-party warrants issued on the application of the Director 
General of ASIO. The Committee noted that ‘there is no existing requirement 
for telephone intercept warrants issued by the Attorney and associated 
documents to be destroyed, but monitoring and inspection regimes do 
apply’.156 The Committee made a generic recommendation relating to the 
destruction, supervision of destruction, justification and reporting of B party 
warrants.157 The legislation, however, continues to allow the Director General 
of ASIO great discretion and there is no obligation to destroy records or 
copies of communications intercepted under B-Party warrants.158 In 
responding to the generic recommendation mentioned above, the Howard 
government favoured retaining such discretion, not considering it necessary 
to stipulate specific supervision requirements for destruction of material,159 









                                                                                                               
Legislation Committee Report on the provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) 
Amendment Bill 2006.  
156 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 5, 43. The Committee 
cited an extract of the submission by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security that 
‘the nature of B-party interception warrants inherently involves a potential for greater privacy 
intrusion for persons who may not be involved in activities of legitimate concern under the 
ASIO Act….As a result, particular attention will be given to the additional legislative tests for 
this type of warrant, as well as checking that the duration of 90 days is adhered to’: ibid 43-4. 
157 Ibid 45, Recommendation 24: that ‘there should be strict supervision arrangements 
introduced to ensure the destruction of non-material content in any form; the number and 
justification of B-party interception warrants should be separately recorded by the Agency Co-
ordinator and reported to the Attorney-General; and the use of such warrants should be 
reported to the Parliament.’ 
158 See Telecommunications (Interception and Access Act) 1979 (Cth) s 14: ‘Where (a) a 
record or copy has been made of a communication intercepted by virtue of a Part 2-2 warrant; 
(b) the record or copy is in the possession or custody, or under the control, of the Organisation; 
and (c) the Director-General of Security is satisfied that the record or copy is not required, and 
is not likely to be required, in or in connection with the performance by the Organisation of its 
functions or the exercise of its powers (including the powers conferred by sections 64 and 65) 
the Director-General shall cause the record or copy to be destroyed.’ 
159 Government Response to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report on 
the provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2006, 
Recommendation 24. 
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B The Urgency Aspect and Concentration of 
Executive Power Manifested in the 
Telecommunications Interception Amendment 
Bill 2006 – Subsequent Debate in Parliament 
 
Parliamentary debate subsequent to the release of the Senate Committee 
report reveals sharply contrasting appraisals of the issues of urgency and 
concentration of executive power in relation to the Telecommunications 
Interception Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), indicating the volatile political 
usages of the bill. The contrast is between the non-government criticism of 
the haste of the legislative processes, precluding proper review, on the one 
hand, and the Howard government claims of urgency and delay, on the other. 
 
Non-government senators repeatedly voiced serious concerns about the 
truncated Committee review and parliamentary processes surrounding this 
bill. Distinctive issues emerged: the adverse effect of the haste of the review 
process on the quality of submissions and the ability of the Senate Committee 
to respond;160 the marginalisation of the Senate process by the hearing in one 
city;161 the use of the Committee inquiry as a substitute for part of the second 
reading committee stage;162 the claimed unwillingness of the Attorney-
General to give substantive attention to improving protections under the 
bill;163 the failure of even government-senator-supported committee 
recommendations in the Senate Committee report to be accepted;164 and the 
fact that government members of the committee, having supported the 
recommendations, were forced to vote against the recommendations in the 
Senate.165 
 
The Howard government response was unyielding. The concentration of 
executive power, which was characteristic of the process of enacting counter-
terrorism legislation in Australia, was evident, first, in the ongoing 
consideration of the Committee’s recommendations following passage of the 
legislation.166 Such an ex post facto approach is implicitly remedial and 
                                                
160 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 March 2006, 116 (Senator Joe 
Ludwig). 
161 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 March 2006, 34 (Senator Bob Brown). 
162 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 March 2006, 40 (Senator Natasha Stott 
Despoja). 
163 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 March 2006, 1 (Senator Joe Ludwig). 
164 Ibid 11 (Senator Joe Ludwig). 
165 Ibid 43 (Senator Natasha Stott Despoja). 
166 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 March 2006, 117 (Senator Chris 
Ellison): ‘The government will continue to consider recommendations made by the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee and that consideration will take place over the 
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discretionary in nature. A further aspect of that executive discretion was 
shown by the implementation by the Coalition of the Senate Committee’s 
recommendations.167 There is evidence that many of the substantive 
recommendations were rejected168 and that merely minor recommendations 
were accepted. This was symptomatic of a government tendency in counter-
terrorism legislative reform of over-stating the range of liberty-preserving 
concessions or safeguards incorporated into the legislation.169 It demonstrates 
that executive discretion controls not merely whether or not substantive 
recommendations are taken up, but also how those recommendations are 
presented as being taken up. 
 
As if to provide a further dimension to the urgency claim, Attorney-General 
Ruddock complained of what he considered the protracted process of Senate 
Committee investigation and reporting.170 This perceived slowness meant that 
any further amendments considered necessary should, in the Attorney-
General’s view, be considered later and introduced in a subsequent session of 
                                                                                                               
coming months. In the event that further amendments are necessary, the government 
anticipates addressing those issues in the spring sittings this year’. A near identical earlier 
statement was made by the Senator: see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 28 
March 2006, 93 (Senator Chris Ellison). See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 29 March 2006, 31 (Senator Chris Ellison): ‘We have adopted some of its 
recommendations and will continue to consider some of its other recommendations’ and 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 March 2006, 98 (Hon 
Philip Ruddock). 
167 ‘Indeed, out of the 28 recommendations, as I understand it, a total of 11 are reflected in the 
bill either by way of taking up a recommendation or having already been there’: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 March 2006, 13 (Senator Chris Ellison). 
168 See Government Response and Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 March 
2006, 14 (Senator Joe Ludwig): ‘The Attorney-General has picked up one substantive 
recommendation out of the Committee report’; Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
Senate, 30 March 2006, 15 (Senator Natasha Stott Despoja): ‘I do not think that 11 
recommendations are a lot to boast about, just quietly, but there is also the fact that they are 
not exactly the largest substantive recommendations’; ‘I honestly thought that more than 11 
recommendations and certainly some substantial ones would be picked up’: Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 30 March 2006, 15 (Senator Natasha Stott Despoja). 
169 Frequently using the devices of ‘detail’ and ‘balance’ mentioned at above n 8 in the 
introduction. 
170 ‘The Senate Committee took some weeks. They would say it was an expeditious 
consideration of the bill. But it was some weeks, and the committee report was tabled on 
Monday…this bill is to deal with matters that would otherwise be the subject of a sunset clause 
dealing with stored communications. We did not want to see those important measures come 
to an end, and that is why the legislation has been progressed not in haste but to ensure that 
these issues have been dealt with before that sunset clause comes into effect…I think the 
urgency is apparent’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 30 
March 2006, 97-98 (Hon Phillip Ruddock). 
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Parliament.171 The imagined Senate dilatoriness is also striking evidence of 
the ascendancy of executive values in counter-terrorism law reform - the 
Senate review processes were at odds with a pre-determined government 
position.172 The government nonetheless claimed that the majority of 
recommendations of the Senate Committee report were adopted.173 This 
distinctive reply gives the illusion of responsiveness by the executive to the 
Senate Committee recommendations, whilst creating a degree of legislative 
momentum, confirmatory of the assertions of legislative urgency. This 
incident represents a new twist to the legislative claims of urgency. 
 
 
VIII LARGER REFLECTIONS UPON THE MEANING OF 
URGENCY: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE APPLICATION OF 
URGENCY IN ENACTING COUNTER-TERRORISM 
LEGISLATION BY THE HOWARD GOVERNMENT 
 
A General Observations 
 
A major unifying theme examined in this article has been the repeatedly 
claimed need of Attorney-General Ruddock to enact counter-terrorism 
legislation in an urgent manner. The roles of various review processes which 
are available to scrutinise legislation prior or subsequent to its enactment 
have been shaped in response to this urgency claim. The nomenclature and 
culture of urgency as cultivated by Attorney-General Ruddock carry with 
them certain legislative assumptions and implications, signalling broader 
political applications and consequences of counter-terrorism law.174  
 
                                                
171 Ibid 98 (Hon Phillip Ruddock). 
172 ‘The point I make is that there is urgency associated with this legislation. It is in a form that 
was acceptable to government members. My goodwill, as evidenced in a desire to further 
consider matters that have been raised in a bipartisan way in the Senate, should not be made 
light of…It is only more likely to serve to encourage people to become more intransigent’: ibid 
99 (Hon Philip Ruddock). 
173 Government Response to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee Report on 
the provisions of the Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Bill 2006 (Government 
response to Recommendation 28: Accepted in part): ‘The Government has accepted the 
majority of the recommendations of the Senate Committee’s report, with 18 of the 
recommendations already partly or wholly addressed through changes made to the 
Amendment Bill prior to passage or noted for future consideration’. 
174 Indeed, the language of urgency has been transformed to policy advocacy by the Attorney-
General’s Department in time critical appraisals of how ‘Today’s terrorist environment is quite 
different’: see Robert Cornall, ‘International Responses to a Changing Security Environment’ 
(2006) Public Administration Today 32, 33. 
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In juxtaposition to the claims of legislative urgency, the rejection of many 
reform recommendations of various respected review committees – either 
during, or subsequent to, the legislative process – is remarkable. A 
predictable pattern of the government invoking a review process involving a 
parliamentary committee or other committee, followed by not seriously 
responding to or implementing its recommendations, has emerged. Attaching 
the label of ‘urgent’ to counter-terrorism legislation provides legitimacy to 
the content of the law and momentum in its enactment. It alters both the 
dynamic and the public perception of the enactment. Rather than the 
enactment of controversial counter-terrorism laws which diminish traditional 
rights being perceived as legislating in haste, those laws are perceived as 
responsible and necessary. The passing of urgent laws is therefore made 
synonymous with discharging a primary governmental obligation: protection 
of the community. 
 
Similar to another, earlier identified process used by the government for 
justifying the latest example of counter-terrorism law,175 several common 
characteristics of the paradigm of urgency can be derived from the experience 
of the legislative process examined in this article. 
 
The claim of urgency by Attorney-General Ruddock was invoked so 
frequently, in relation to successive pieces of counter-terrorism legislation, as 
to be normalised into a paradigm or culture of urgency. The regularity and 
volume of counter-terrorism law reform has crystallised the development of 
this urgency culture, creating real difficulties in the scrutiny of counter-
terrorism law reform. 
 
The emphasis upon urgency rationalises the brief time frames afforded for 
review of proposed legislation, without conceding that the competency of 
review will inevitably be compromised through artificially created time 
pressures. Indeed, the granting of review processes (however compromised 
by time constraints) acts as a politically legitimating device for the bona fides 
of legislation, including present enactment of legislation with subsequent 
                                                
175 See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 12 August 2004, 26476 (Senator 
Kerry Nettle) citing Joo Cheong Tham’s analysis of the government’s ‘distinctive modus 
operandi when proposing new anti-terrorism laws’ with a formula resting on five key 
strategies, namely ‘Capitalise on terrorist incidents by proposing new anti-terrorism measures 
in the wake of such events and justifying them on the basis of being tough on terror.’; ‘Propose 
changes which have nothing or very little to do with these terrorist incidents’; ‘Fetishise 
proposed anti-terrorism measures by depicting them as imperative in the ‘War on Terror’’; 
‘Ignore the existing panoply of anti-terrorism measures . Imply that measures are needed 
because a gap exists’ and ‘pretend that the proposals only target persons engaged in extreme 
acts of political religious violence’. 
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review. Review of proposed legislation contemporaneous with the 
parliamentary process, or, more recently, ex post facto review of legislation, 
provides an illusion of regularity in the legislative process. The invocation of 
the review process takes place, however, without any obligation on the 
government to implement amendments or to re-draft legislation in response 
to review recommendations. The relative lack of implementing review 
recommendations is the manifestation of this discretion. By contrast with its 
mantra of urgency, the Coalition acted here with lassitude and inertia. 
 
Indeed, the noncommittal nature of the Coalition government response to 
review processes actually reflects the larger issue of increasing executive 
discretion, a prominent characteristic of government behaviour in counter-
terrorism matters. Where a claim of urgency arose, executive discretion 
manifested itself firstly as the executive selectively asserting, identifying and 
defining what constitutes urgency. Subsequently, it meant the executive 
giving urgent priority to counter-terrorism legislation within its legislative 
program. Furthermore, the promise of ex post facto review as a consequence 
of or reward for the speedy passage of counter-terrorism legislation assumed 
a trust in the positive exercise of discretion and a confidence in the bona fides 
of the government’s stated intention to eventually legislate in response to 
review committee recommendations.  
 
The characteristics of the urgency paradigm were also manifested in the 
extent of executive discretion conferred in counter-terrorism legislation, 
being the means by which the legislation practically operates. The security 
argument here was that, in declining to adopt more stringent safeguards, it 
allowed the purposes of the legislation to be acted on and implemented more 
speedily, with a greater ambit for discretion, and therefore, urgently. What 
was striking was that the executive discretions conferred (and the lower level 
of legislated safeguards) were actually advanced as a safeguard. The ambit of 
such discretion was inverted to be presented as a positive, requiring an 
investment of trust by the public in the executive and an emphasis upon the 
integrity of those entrusted with that executive-based discretion. With 
security discretion so derived from and associated with the urgency of the 
task at hand, the absence of sufficient mechanisms for review and of 
sufficient safeguards increases the likelihood that such ongoing powers will 
be improperly applied. Urgency, in its linkage to discretion, has resulted in an 
accrual of executive power through counter-terrorism legislation.176 This 
                                                
176 Several commentators have remarked about this ongoing concentration of executive power 
as a consequence of serial enactment of counter-terrorism legislation: see Jenny Hocking , 
‘Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australia’s New Security Powers of 
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misleading claim of governmental discretion as a safeguard of the public 
interest has faltered with a series of misapplied exercises of discretion in 
national security matters, and with adverse comments being made in the 
courts in situations emerging from the use of discretion.177 That investment of 
trust in the executive, implicit in the discretion-as-safeguard argument, has 
been significantly diminished by these incidents.  
 
A general conclusion that could be formed from the legislation discussed 
above is that those counter-terrorism legislative reforms which extended 
executive discretion were treated as urgent, whereas review committee 
recommendations of restraint upon discretion were often treated dismissively, 
that is, as anything but urgent. The paradigm of urgency evaporated in 
relation to implementing the checks and balances mandated in parliamentary 
and committee reviews. This indicates that the meaning of ‘urgency’ has 
been essentially subjective - its content was largely defined and articulated by 
Attorney-General Ruddock. Far from having an ascertainable, objective 
content, the paradigm of urgency is perhaps better considered as a newer 
disposition or modus operandi attaching to the counter terrorism legislative 
process, deployed as and when required for political advantage.178  
 
                                                                                                               
Detention, Proscription and Control’ (2003) 49 Australian Journal of Politics and History 355, 
355; Jude McCulloch, ‘Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation and the Jack Thomas Case’ 
(2006) 18 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 357, 363-4; Jude McCulloch, ‘National 
(In)Security Politics in Australia: Fear and the Federal Election’ (2004) 29 Alternative Law 
Journal 87, 91; Julian Burnside, ‘Protecting Rights in a Climate of Fear’ (2007) Victorian Bar 
News 70, 71; Catherine Brooks, ‘The First Casualty of Law’ (2007) Lawyers Weekly 14-15; 
and Murray McInnis, ‘Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Issues for the Courts’ (2006) AIAL Forum 
1, 8. Others dispute an adverse impact upon civil liberties through this concentrated executive 
power: see Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska, ‘Australian Counter-terrorism Offences: 
Necessity and Clarity in Federal Criminal Law reforms’ (2007) 31 Criminal Law Journal 20, 
55; and Paul O’Sullivan, ‘9/11 Five Years Later: Where To From Here?’ (2006) 18 The 
Sydney Papers 189, 191-2. 
177 The most prominent examples are the cases of Mohamed Haneef – see Haneef v Minister 
for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273 (21 August 2007); Scott Parkin - see Parkin 
v O’Sullivan [2006] FCA 1413 (3 November 2006); Izhar Ul-Haque – see R v Ul-Haque 
[2007] NSWSC 1251; and Joseph Terrence Thomas - see R v Thomas [2006] VSCA 165 (18 
August 2006).  
178 In that sense, it is also possible to see the uses of urgency in a counter-terrorism legislative 
context ‘as a “wedge…issue”, designed to divide, confuse and embarrass…opponents, play 
upon hostility towards unpopular groups, and gain the support of voters who would otherwise 
tend to support the Labor Party’: Harry Evans, ‘Executive and Parliament’ in Chris Aulich and 
Roger Wettenhall, Howard’s Second and Third Governments Australian Commonwealth 
Administration 1998-2004 (2005), 54. See also Gwynneth Singleton, ‘Issues and Agendas: 
Howard in Control’, in Chris Aulich and Roger Wettenhall (eds), Howard's Second And Third 
Governments: Australian Commonwealth Administration, 1998-2004 (2005) 3, 15. 
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The claim of urgency advanced by Attorney-General Ruddock also 
highlighted a particular set of relations and government perceptions of the 
relationship between the executive and Parliament and broader matters of 
representative government and democracy. This relationship has several 
distinctive characteristics. 
 
B The Status of Different Forms of Review 
 
One characteristic is the relative status accorded by the executive to 
parliamentary committee review and extra-parliamentary review. Within the 
paradigm of urgency, it was clear that the status of those forms of review, or 
the relative merits in different possible forms of review – as confirmed, for 
example, by the time afforded to review committees to carry out the review, 
or the extent to which review committee recommendations were acted upon – 
was distinctly inferior to review of terrorism legislation by the executive or 
through an executive related process. This inferior status is corroborated by 
several factors. On occasions, suggested amendments to introduce safeguards 
like those operating in other jurisdictions were rejected for no sound 
reason.179 Often the changes adopted from such review processes were those 
that are amenable to executive orientated objectives and were therefore 
selectively adopted. Alternatively, the recommendations were promoted as 
having been adopted, when quite limited implementation had in fact 
occurred. This inferior status has been further confirmed by Howard 
government members of parliamentary review committees voting against 
their own committee recommendations at the time of passage of the 
legislation, as well as by the fact that the consultative process through the 
Attorney-General’s backbench committee has greater authority than other 





                                                
179 Two prominent examples are the establishment by legislation of an Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Law (based on the UK Independent Reviewer) and the inclusion of meaningful 
sunset clauses on counter-terrorism legislation, linked to a legislated form of review of 
relevant legislation. On the issue of the Independent Reviewer, see Sheller Committee Report, 
above n 1, 8 and 202-3; and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, 
above n 2, xv and 16-21. See also the introduction of a private member’s bill: Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Laws Bill 2008 (Cth) by Liberal Party backbencher Petro Georgiou: 
see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 17 March 2008, 76-7. 
On the issue of legislated sunset clauses, see Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation 
Committee, above n 3, xi (Recommendation 18) and xii (Recommendation 26) and xiv 
(Recommendation 38).  
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C The Government Claim of Ongoing Review 
 
A further rejoinder emerged to the claim that parliamentary committee 
review of counter-terrorism legislation was being given too low a status. This 
rejoinder, reflecting an immediacy of response associated with the urgency 
paradigm, was the Howard government claim that counter-terrorism 
legislation was under constant executive, as distinct from parliamentary, 
review. A claim of ongoing executive review does several things – it 
appropriates the concept of ‘review’ and locates it within a government or 
bureaucracy-based sphere of what should be reviewed.180 It creates the 
illusion of balanced review, legitimating the passage of legislation in a 
speedy manner. It enables parliamentary committee or independent review to 
be incorporated within an established, ongoing executive-based review 
process. Operational considerations can further be invoked to justify the need 
for locating review within the sphere of executive control, and also allow 
individual, non-executive review committee recommendations to be rejected 
as impractical. 
 
Such ongoing review may also further distinctive government-orientated 
objectives and give rise to political opportunities available in counter-
terrorism legislative areas. Opposition party contributions to the broader form 
of parliamentary committee review are then able to be subsumed, neutralised 
or discredited. This further encourages the ceding of political expertise on 
national security counter-terrorism matters to the government, the Opposition 
being keen to retreat and to limit disagreement. A government armed with an 
established urgency paradigm is able to activate it to extract political 
advantage, by showing decisiveness and by exploiting perceived weakness in 





                                                
180 An illustrative example of this phenomenon is found in Philip Ruddock, ‘A Safe and Secure 
Australia: An Update on Counter-Terrorism’ (2006) 2 Original Law Review 40, 48-9: where 
the former Attorney-General referred to reviews by the Sheller Committee, COAG and the 
ALRC to state the claim that ‘I see these reviews as an important element in ensuring that law 
enforcement and security agencies have sufficient, targeted powers and are also accountable 
for the exercise of those powers’. 
181As Lynch describes the situation, ‘to oppose or seek amendment of these Bills is to risk 
being portrayed as exposing the community to unnecessary danger”: Lynch, above n 7, 776. A 
most obvious example was in ‘the fact that the confluence of issues surrounding the boat 
people, Tampa and 11 September terrorist attacks were skilfully exploited by Howard’: 
Singleton, above n 178, 12. 
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D Invoking a Preventative and Protective Principle 
 
A further dimension of the urgency paradigm is to be found in government 
advocacy of an overwhelming responsibility to exercise protective and 
preventative functions through the enactment of counter-terrorism provisions 
– that is, to do everything conceivable in a counter-terrorism legislative and 
executive sense.182 This is an adapted version of the preventative principle 
derived from environmental law and policy.183 Restraints on executive power 
in the form of committee recommendations are seen as compromising this 
protective or preventative principle – raising political costs and risks in the 
event of a terrorist incident, and also preventing maximum political leverage 
being gained from regularly exercising power by enacting legislation. This 
preventative approach invokes executive discretion based on the argument 
that such discretion is necessary to avert catastrophe, and through 
highlighting the political consequences should such catastrophes occur. It 
was linked by Attorney-General Ruddock to an improperly reconstituted 
international legal obligation to protect.184  
 
E Consequences for Representative Government 
Institutions and Practices 
 
The intersection of legislative processes with the urgency associated with 
enlarged manifestations of executive discretion relating to counter-terrorism 
has significant consequences for representative government institutions and 
                                                
182 See Philip Ruddock, ‘Primary Duty To Protect Our Nation’ (Press Release 13 August 
2007); Philip Ruddock, ‘Legislating Against Atrocities’ (2007) Lawyers Weekly 16, 16; and 
Ruddock, above n 180, 46. Lynch considers that this focus upon prevention has meant that 
‘precautionary justifications for the enlargement of the scope of criminality and the diminution 
of civil liberties have been taken to their logical extreme’: Lynch, above n 7, 780. 
183 See Jacqueline Peel, The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision 
Making and Scientific Uncertainty (2005); Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (6th 
ed, 2006) 129-37; and Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle 
in International Law (2002). See also Adrian Deville and Ronnie Harding, Applying the 
Precautionary Principle (1997); Hughes, ‘The Status of the “Precautionary Principle” in Law’ 
(1995) 7 Journal of Environmental Law 224; Warwick Gullett, ‘Environmental Protection and 
the Precautionary Principle: A Response to Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental 
Management’ (1997) 14 Environment and Planning Law Journal 52. 
184 On this point see Christopher Michaelsen, ‘Security Against Terrorism: Individual Rights 
or State Purpose?’ (2005) 16 Public Law Review 178; Michaelsen, above n 8, 11-15; Greg 
Carne, ‘Reconstituting “Human Security” in a New Security Environment: One Australian, 
Two Canadians and Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (2006) 25 
Australian Year Book of International Law 1; Bronitt and McSherry, above n 8, 875; and 
Andrew Lynch, ‘Exceptionalism, Politics and Liberty: A Response to Professor Tushnet from 
the Antipodes’ (2008) International Journal of Law in Context 305, 306. 
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practices, the ultimate subjects warranting protection from terrorism. Due to 
the fact that the focus in such debate as occurs is almost exclusively upon 
physical protection of persons and property through counter-terrorism laws, 
the impact of such laws upon the regularity and propriety of those institutions 
and practices – in short upon protecting representative democracy – has been 
inadequately considered. 
 
At least within the example of serial counter-terrorism law reform, the role of 
parliamentary scrutiny, contribution and debate has been severely 
compromised by the habituation of legislative practices to an urgency 
paradigm and methodology. That urgency paradigm and methodology, 
applied in a setting of serial counter-terrorism law reform to extract political 
advantage, and without any systematic justification of what further legislative 
change was objectively urgent, became the expected, normal method of 
Howard government counter-terrorism legislative enactment. This 
development unfortunately reinforced traditional deference to the interests of 
the executive in national security matters. It represented an ascendancy of 
executive mandated legislation, framing legislative amendment as a 
concession from executive authority. 
 
By doing so, urgency further re-cast the practice of parliamentary 
representative democracy along narrowly functional and formal lines, in 
place of a more deliberative and consultative democratic model. 
Characteristics of the narrower model include the emphasis on a broad 
executive mandate obtained by periodic elections,185 the inappropriateness of 
engaged civic participation influencing changes to proposed legislation,186 
with only elected representatives initiating activity187 and with those 
representatives not obliged to form a consultative relationship with their 
electors.188 
                                                
185 The emphasis by the Howard government in executive-Senate relations on an electorally 
acquired mandate to implement all policies, with Senate opposition characterised as 
illegitimate, is discussed by Evans, above n 178, 45-6. Frustrations with the lack of a Senate 
majority until 2005 saw the Howard government propose two options for radical constitutional 
changes relating to joint sittings of the two chambers: ibid 46-8. The Senate’s proportional 
electoral system was also the subject of contemplated reform by the Howard government to 
increase its chances of winning a majority of Senate seats: see Senator Helen Coonan, ‘The 
Senate: Safeguard or Handbrake on Democracy?’ (1999) 11 Sydney Papers 106 (Address to 
the Sydney Institute). 
186 Such civic participation being confined to voting and discussion to provide for regular 
functioning of electoral requirements: see Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic 
Theory (1970), 5. 
187 Ibid. 
188 David Held, Models of Democracy (1987), 165. 
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In contrast, a deliberative model ‘emerges as a qualification of pure and 
simple democracy, and as a check against what has been termed 
“majoritarian democracy” in which law and policy are formed on the basis of 
the preferences of the majority, with few protections for the rights of 
minorities, … to be heard in the central councils of political debate…’189 
 
The paradigm of urgency created legislative conditions necessarily at odds 
with a properly deliberative model. Such a model would produce carefully 
tailored, calibrated and proportionate responses190 to terrorism issues. 
Consensus and bi-partisanship would be arrived at by testing options and 
identifying unanticipated legal and other difficulties in the draft legislation, 
and by allowing adequate time and space for deliberation and compromise in 
parliamentary committee inquiries and chamber debate. Such inquiries and 
debate would draw upon and be improved by both formal and informal 
political contributions of citizens.  
 
The volume of counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 2001 in 
Australia,191 with the practice of frequent new legislation and amendment, 
have accentuated such consequences of the urgency paradigm. Aside from 
inadequate checks and balances, urgency is likely to produce drafting errors 
and creates a false confidence or an over-reliance on legislation as a counter-
terrorism response, since speedily enacted laws create an illusion of action.192 
Furthermore, that paradigm of urgency is potentially transferable to other, 
non-terrorism based legislation, multiplying the adverse consequences for 




                                                
189 Uhr, above n 16, 10. A deliberative democratic model in a system of representative 
government also assumes a ‘link between political representation and ‘participatory 
democracy’, embodying the practices of active citizenship in the form of political 
participation, ‘as an effective instrument of accountability for the elected and bureaucratic elite 
in whose hands the day to day power of government typically rested’: ibid 11. 
190 Indeed, many of the recommendations of the Sheller Committee in reviewing existing 
counter-terrorism legislation relate to amending those laws to make them more proportionate 
to the nature of the terrorism threat addressed.  
191 See Commonwealth Parliamentary Library Website for a summary of the many pieces of 
counter-terrorism legislation enacted since 2001: Parliamentary Library, Terrorism Law 
Parliament of Australia Parliamentary Library <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/law/ 
terrorism.htm#terrchron> at 22 August 2008 (Chronology of Legislative and other Legal 
Developments since 11 September 2001). 
192 This impetus to be seen as responding legislatively to a terrorism attack is also described by 
Krygier, above n 7, 127-8. 
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F A Lack of Conformity with International Human 
Rights Standards 
 
The paradigm of urgency makes it difficult to achieve consistency of counter-
terrorism legislation with international human rights standards, as the role of 
parliamentary and independent review which would invoke such standards is 
marginalised. The absence of a charter of rights at the Commonwealth level 
means that there is no systematic pre-legislative assessment of an Act’s 
conformity with human rights principles in the drafting, review and 
enactment stages. Such assessment of conformity with human rights must 
ordinarily occur on an ad hoc basis, so the invocation of urgency in this 
situation effectively precludes structured review and analysis of compliance 
with international human rights standards. 
 
On a superficial level, these consequences of the urgency model as applied to 
counter-terrorism law reform resonate strongly with the preferred 
parliamentary model of human rights protection, expressed by the 
Commonwealth government in the key document Australia’s National 
Framework for Human Rights National Action Plan.193 However, such a 
parliamentary model must be understood to be a formalist, procedural 
model,194 rather than a deliberative model of democracy as outlined above. 
 
G Concentrating Executive Power for Political 
Advantage 
 
In a broader sense, the consequences of the urgency paradigm, as examined 
in this article in the context of major examples of counter-terrorism law 
reform, are also part of a more general assertion and expansion of executive 
power by the Howard government across a host of policy areas, at the 
expense of wider conceptions of representative democracy. This phenomenon 
has attracted considerable commentary,195 much of it focused upon an 
                                                
193 Attorney-General’s Department, Australia’s National Framework For Human Rights 
National Action Plan (2004) Australian Government: Attorney-General’s Department 
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publications_Australiasnationalframeworkforh
umanrights-NationalActionPlan-December2004> at 13 August 2008. 
194 In the sense that the scope and formal legislative recognition of human rights as 
legislatively expressed will be determined by the executive, which is antipathetic to 
international human rights influences and sees a limited role for public contribution into 
legislative expression of those rights. 
195 See, for example, Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison, Silencing Dissent: How the 
Australian Government is Controlling Public Opinion and Stifling Debate (2007); David Marr 
‘His Master’s Voice The Corruption of Public Debate Under Howard’ (2007) 26 Quarterly 
Essay 1; Judith Brett ‘Relaxed and Comfortable: The Liberal Party’s Australia’ (2005) 19 
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incremental, transformative erosion of rights and a curtailing of the open, 
deliberative characteristics of Australian democracy. 
 
The paradigm of urgency in Australian counter-terrorism law was elevated to 
a central legislative operating principle and given new momentum under the 
stewardship of Attorney-General Ruddock, truncating debate as part of an 
ongoing counter-terrorism legislative agenda. That agenda was strategically 
used to drive the political objectives of the concentration of executive power 
and the casting of Opposition and minor parties as weak on national security. 
The election of a new Labor government, which at various times in 
opposition had raised objections to the practical legislative consequences of 
urgency in counter-terrorism law reform, may provide opportunities for the 
egregious aspects of that urgency-driven counter-terrorism legislative agenda 
to be addressed and remedied. It is too early to predict how durable the 
Howard government urgency culture in counter-terrorism law and its 
enactments actually are, as well as to assess how explicitly the Rudd 
government will act to remediate them. Some preliminary observations can, 
however, be offered. 
 
 
IX ENDURING LEGACY OR TRANSITIONAL ADJUSTMENT?: 
URGENCY, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE RUDD 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
The enduring habits of Howard government urgency culture in counter-
terrorism law may be seen in the Rudd government’s first piece of counter-
terrorism-related legislation, the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth). In the bill’s second reading speech, 
Attorney-General McClelland identified the bill as ‘time critical’196 and then 
described a number of further amendments as merely technical.197 The latter 
description echoed Howard government practices as the bill’s original 
                                                                                                               
Quarterly Essay 1; Margo Kingston, Not Happy John (2004); Margo Kingston, Still Not 
Happy John (2007); Linda Weiss, Elizabeth Thurbon and John Matthews, National Insecurity 
The Howard Government’s Betrayal of Australia (2007); Robert Manne, (ed) The Howard 
Years (2004); Robert Manne, ‘Little America: How John Howard Has Changed Australia’ 
(2006) The Monthly 20 (March); Judith Brett, ‘The Unravelling of John Howard (Exit Right) 
(Critical essay)’ (2007) 28 Quarterly Essay 1. 
196 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 February 2008, 836 
(Hon Robert McClelland). 
197 Ibid 837 (Hon Robert McClelland): stating that ‘Again, the amendments do not provide any 
new powers for law enforcement or security agencies…The process for adding additional 
devices to a device based named person warrant will be clarified and aligned with the existing 
process for service based named person warrants’. 
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drafting provided for a substantial expansion of power through the 
subsequent interception of further communications devices without new 
warrant authority. 
 
On 19 March 2008, the bill was referred to the Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, with the due date for the report being 1 
May 2008. The Senate Committee in its report198 observed that the bill’s 
provisions would enable interception agencies to add new devices to a 
warrant, without further independent scrutiny by the issuing authority.199 The 
Committee was of the view that ‘after the fact’ reporting is insufficient to 
adequately address issues associated with individuals’ ‘privacy and rights’.200 
It considered ‘that the process of adding a device to a device-based named 
person warrant after the warrant has been issued should include an 
independent scrutiny process’.201 It is the Supplementary Report of the 
Committee202 however, which sharply highlights the persistent influence of 
the Howard government’s urgency culture203 upon the Rudd government’s 
first enactment of a counter-terrorism law.  
 
The Rudd government did, however, respond more positively to the Senate 
Committee recommendations in relation to device-based named person 
warrants. It acknowledged that ‘the bill as introduced proposed to allow a 
device-based named person warrant to permit the interception of multiple 
devices as well as to allow intercepting agencies to add further devices to the 
warrant as they are identified’204 and acknowledged Recommendations 3 and 
                                                
198 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Commonwealth 
Parliament, Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2008 (2008). 
199 Ibid 27. 
200 Ibid 32. 
201 Ibid 40. The proposed scrutiny process was set down in Recommendation 3 and 
Recommendation 4 of the Report.  
202 Ibid: Supplementary Report with Additional Comments of Dissent by the Australian 
Democrats (Senator Stott Despoja). 
203 Ibid. See Supplementary Report paragraphs 1.6, 1.9 and 1.10: ‘It is of great concern…that 
on the first occasion that the new Government turns its mind to any form of legislation that 
impacts upon Australia’s national security regime, it has labelled the bill “time critical” and 
sought to limit debate…in one of the first legislative acts in the new Parliament, the 
Government has revisited this legislation, attempted to curtail debate, and has made no attempt 
to address the numerous concerns that it had with the legislation in 2006…Further it is 
clear…that the amendments proposed by this bill are far from “minor” or “technical”…the 
amendments in relation to device based warrants “propose to remove an important existing 
safeguard”’. See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 May 2008, 1686-
1688 (Senator Andrew Bartlett). 
204 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 May 2008, 1693 (Senator Joe 
Ludwig). 
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4 in the Report.205 It decided to accept these recommendations for further 
consideration, and, given the time constraints and complicated drafting 
issues, to move amendments ‘to the bill that remove the provisions allowing 
agencies to add devices to device-based named person warrants’.206 
 
Similarly, the absence as yet of a comprehensive remedial legislative agenda 
of the Rudd government to address the most egregious aspects of the urgency 
phenomenon in a range of counter-terrorism law may mean that, by default, 
inferior laws that fail tests of necessity and proportionality will persist 
unnoticed, when not invoked in circumstances producing controversy.207 
Ironically, the likelihood of legislative remediation may in fact diminish if 
there is a shift in the Rudd government’s counter-terrorism priorities away 
from new legislative responses towards a concentration on other aspects of 
counter-terrorism policy, including desisting from using counter-terrorism 
enactment practices for overtly political purposes. 
 
Evidence does exist of a new emphasis in counter-terrorism policy away from 
a dominating legislative agenda. The first major address of the new Attorney-
General, Robert McClelland, regarding national security, gave considerable 
precedence to community-building, public diplomacy and inclusive 
development, in order to reduce the barriers causing alienation of some 
                                                
205 Above n 198, Recommendation 3: ‘The Committee recommends that the bill be amended to 
provide that an agency be permitted to add a device to a device-based named person warrant 
after the warrant has been issued if the facts of the case would have justified the issue of a 
warrant by the issuing authority; and the investigation in relation to the person named in the 
warrant will be, or is likely to be, seriously prejudiced if the interception does not proceed.’ 
Recommendation 4: ‘The committee further recommends that the Bill be amended to provide 
that if an agency adds a telecommunications device or devices not identified on a device-based 
named person warrant at the time that the issuing authority issued the warrant: (i) the agency 
be required to notify an issuing authority, within 2 working days, that a device had been added 
to the warrant; and (ii) the issuing authority must examine the supporting documentation 
against the criteria that it would have considered, in accordance with the requirements of the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, in relation to an application by an 
agency for a device-based named person warrant, and make a determination about whether the 
facts of the case justified the addition of the device; and (iii) the issuing authority shall order 
that the interception cease immediately and that all evidence gathered be destroyed if it 
determines that the facts of the case would not have supported the issue of a device based 
named person warrant.’ 
206 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 14 May 2008, 1693 (Senator Joe 
Ludwig). 
207 Such as the controversial detention of Dr Mohamed Haneef, brought about through the 
operation of the ‘dead time’ provisions (ss 23CA(8)(m) and 23CB of the Crimes Act 1914 
(Cth) which effectively allowed the 24 hours of allowable questioning to be distributed over a 
number of days whilst Haneef was held in continuous custody. 
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segments of the community.208 Interestingly, the concomitants of the previous 
government’s dominant counter-terrorism legislative agenda, such as its 
heavy emphasis on national security laws and the exploitation of insecurity 
for political gain, were also criticised.209  
 
The shift in emphasis away from further counter-terrorism laws was also 
noticeable in the recommendations of the Street Review of the Australian 
Federal Police.210 The recommendations included the establishment of a co-
ordinating Committee between ASIO, the AFP and the Commonwealth 
DPP;211 the adoption of a Joint Operations Protocol between the AFP and 
ASIO;212 the formalisation of the role of the Commonwealth DPP in giving 
advice regarding prosecutions during the planning stages of actual or likely 
terrorism offence investigations;213 the physical co-location and participation 
of ASIO officers in Joint Counter-Terrorism teams;214 the automated sharing 
of information through an integrated technology system;215 and enhanced co-
operative training arrangements.216 
 
The new White Paper on terrorism217 and the inquiry into the Haneef 
matter218 will necessarily touch upon the matters of executive discretion and 
                                                
208 Robert McClelland, ‘Security in Government Conference’, (Speech delivered at the 
Security in Government Conference, Canberra, 7 December 2007) <http://www. 
attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/robertmc.nsf/Page/Speeches_2007_FourthQuarter_7De
cember2007-SecurityinGovernmentConference> at 25 August 2008. See Robert McClelland 
2GB Radio, ‘Interview with Philip Clark, 2GB Radio, 5.15PM’, 11 April 2008 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/robertmc.nsf/Page/Transcripts_2008_inter
viewwithphilipclark,2gbradio,5.15PM.> at 25 August 2008. 
209 See Robert McClelland, above n 208.  
210 The Street Review: A Review of the Interoperability Between the AFP and its National 
Security Partners. See also Robert McClelland, ‘Attorney-General Welcomes Release of AFP 
Street Review Recommendations’ (Press Release 13 March 2008) <http://www. 
attorneygeneral.gov.au/www/ministers/robertmc.nsf/Page/MediaReleases_2008_FirstQuarter_
13March2008-Attorney-GeneralwelcomesreleaseofAFPStreetReviewrecommendations > at 25 
August 2008. 
211 Street Review, above n 210, Recommendation 1. 
212 Ibid Recommendation 2. 
213 Ibid Recommendation 3. 
214 Ibid Recommendation 4. 
215 Ibid Recommendation 6. 
216 Ibid Recommendation 8. 
217 For the previous White Paper on Terrorism, see Alexander Downer, ‘Transnational 
Terrorism: The Threat to Australia’ (Press Release 15 July 2004) <http://www.foreignminister. 
gov.au/releases/2004/fa0102_04.html > at 25 August 2008. On 22 February 2008, Prime 
Minister Rudd announced a comprehensive review of Australia’s homeland and border 
security arrangements: See Kevin Rudd, ‘Homeland and Border Security Review’ (Press 
Release 22 February 2008) <http://www.pm.gov.au/media/Release/2008/media_release_ 
0084.cfm> at 25 August 2008. The review ‘will consider the roles, responsibilities and 
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urgency as adversely influential factors in recent years. Similarly, a 
commitment to implement the ALRC recommendations on sedition law will 
provide the opportunity to give real meaning to the ex post facto review 
process mandated by Attorney-General Ruddock as the justification for swift 
passage of the sedition provisions in 2005, instead of the option existing at 
the time to sever Schedule 7 of the then bill and subject it to thorough review 
before enactment. Real evidence of a shift in emphasis would be the 
wholesale enactment by the Rudd government of the recommendations of the 
ALRC report.219 
 
In time, the legacy of hastening slowly as a counter-terrorism legislative 
stratagem may well be identified specifically with damage done to both 
individual rights in celebrated cases, as well as to the fabric of Australian 
democracy. It is too early to make conclusive determinations on this 
emphatic Howard government approach to counter-terrorism laws. What can 
be conservatively said, however, is that the culture of urgency in enacting 
counter-terrorism legislation, coupled with governmental indifference and 
lassitude to enacting many considered review recommendations of those 
same laws, failed to produce optimum legislative outcomes reflecting an 
integrated, holistic response to terrorism issues best protective of the 
institutions and practices of Australian representative democracy.  
                                                                                                               
functions of departments and agencies involved in homeland and border security. The review 
will also consider possible changes to optimise the coordination and effectiveness of our 
homeland and border security efforts’. 
218 See, for example ‘Haneef inquiry flagged’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 1-2 
December 2007, 2; ‘Haneef inquiry essential: Burke’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 2 
November 2007; ‘Haneef Inquiry “A Must”’, The Age (Melbourne), 3 November 2007; 
‘Haneef Inquiry to “Boost” Security’, The Australian (Sydney), 25 February 2008. On 13 
March 2008, it was announced that former NSW Supreme Court judge, Hon John Clarke QC, 
would chair an inquiry into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef: see Robert McClelland, ‘Clarke 
Inquiry into the Haneef Case’, (Press Release 13 March 2008) <http://www.attorneygeneral. 
gov.au/www/ministers/robertmc.nsf/Page/ MediaReleases_2008_FirstQuarter_13March2008-
ClarkeInquiryintotheHaneefCase> at 25 August 2008. The terms of reference of the Inquiry 
require it to examine and report on ‘a. the arrest, detention, charging, prosecution and release 
of Dr Haneef, the cancellation of his Australian visa and the issuing of a criminal justice stay 
certificate; b. the administrative and operational procedures and arrangements of the 
Commonwealth and its agencies relevant to these matters; c. the effectiveness of cooperation, 
coordination and interoperability between Commonwealth agencies and with state 
enforcement agencies relating to these matters; and d. having regard to (a), (b) and (c). any 
deficiencies in the relevant laws or administrative and operational procedures and 
arrangements of the Commonwealth and its agencies, including agency and interagency 
communication protocols and guidelines: Clarke Inquiry into the case of Dr Mohamed Haneef 
Terms of Reference’ <http://www.haneefcaseinquiry.gov.au/www/inquiry/haneefcaseinquiry. 
nsf/Page/Terms_of_Reference> at 25 August 2008.  
219 ALRC Report, above n 4. 
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